



EXISTENTIALIST CONCEPT OF ALIENATION

ABSTRACT


SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy
IN
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BY
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SUMMARY

Alienation has been a persistent problem for man since the beginning of civilization. But it has assumed importance in philosophy and literature in the society with the development of industry and technology on a mass scale. Earlier philosophers, particularly Greeks, were more concerned with the cosmos and ideas. Man was also treated as the manifestation of Rationality (Aristotle). Except Socrates no other western thinker seems to be interested in the individual man of flesh and bones, his sufferings, his choice of destiny, his growth and his death. Of course Greek plays and poetry did not ignore man as an aspiring and suffering individual like Prometheus, philosophy on the whole remained interested in generalizations and universal ideas and principles. Mystics though their approach apparently God-centric, dealt with individual man, for it was he whose spiritual journey was their main concern. In the east Buddhism is the only philosophy that is concerned with human suffering. Buddha was mainly interested in finding out a way out from suffering. Likewise in Sufi tradition we find interest in individual man and his spiritual uplift. These philosophers prescribed ways towards de-alienation.

Hegel was the first western philosopher who discussed the problem of "estrangement" of God from His creation, and in this context he also dealt with the problems of man's Alienation. As against Hegel's idealistic-Rationalistic approach to this problem, Kierkegaard, his contemporary, approached this issue from human view-point and thus laid down foundation of existentialist philosophy of man, which found

exponents in the twentieth century as Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre, Marcel and Camus. Earlier than modern existentialists, Karl Marx, paid attention as to how man is alienated from nature, God, society and himself in capitalist, industrial society. The 20th century "philosophy of man" in a highly mechanical culture dominated by technocracy and bureaucracy found man reduced to the status of a negligible part of a gigantic machinery that resulted in a continuing process of dehumanization, a form and cause of individual's alienation at various levels.

The real problem for existentialist philosophy is not alienation and absurdity of life but it is the problem of overcoming alienation and making life meaningful. I, therefore, have taken up the question of dealienation also at the end of my research thesis as a meaningful conclusion to the discussion on the theme of alienation.

Alienation and dealienation have been amply studied in both philosophy and literature in recent times, because of their great relevance for our times. But so far no comprehensive study of the issue has been taken up by any Indian scholar or researcher. This problem cannot be comprehensively studied without taking into account various conceptions of man. I have taken up this issue also with special reference to main existentialist thinkers.

The predicament of contemporary man is best predicted not only in the absurd literatures of the Anglo-American and European languages but also in the languages of developing world. With the eradication of traditional values and facing the world without a God and where there can be no appeal to supernatural forces and where the traditional religious beliefs have lost their relevance and efficacy, man finds himself

hanging between earth and heaven. His feet cannot reach the earth and his hands are unable to get hold of skies. In the absence of religious beliefs and prospects of another world after this life, man has to squarely face the fact of his death and annihilation.

Since for the most of the contemporary men, there is no God man is the author of his destiny and he is the only source of his values. He is free to choose and as Dostovesky has said, "if there is no god everything is allowed". This implies that man is solely responsible for his condition in this life. Man creates his own society. Man creates his own world. Consequently it is only man who is responsible for his actions. In this situation when man is deprived of the traditional supports of religion and other sorts of supernatural systems, and when he is confronted with a hostile environment in a society where there is no social justice and above all when man has this realization that some day he has to die and that will be the end of his world. He not only feels despair and anguish but often times feels not only alienated from the society and the people around him but also from himself.

Today people have acquired a certain amount of general knowledge regarding the main types of existence, such as that of wage-earner, the salaried employee, the peasant, the handicrafts-man, the entrepreneur, the civil servant. But the general fellowship of our human situation has been rendered even more dubious than before, in as much as, though the old ties of cast have been loosened, a new restriction of the individual to some prescribed status in the sociological machinery has become manifest. What is today common to us all, is not our humanity as a universal and all pervading spirit of fellowship, but the cosmopolitanism

of catchwords in conjunction with the spread of world-wide means of communication. The general sociological situation is not the decisive factor in our destinies, being rather that which threatens us with annihilation. The decisive factor is the developing possibility of a selfhood. This selfhood does not yet exist for contemporary man.

We are not much aware of the pre-historical man although contemporary and anthropological research has been able to bring out massive researches on the life conditions of ancient man who was mostly confined to his tribe culture and mores. He mostly subsisted by mythical views and Ritual engagements. However, subsequently powerful religious traditions emerged and man at different points of history and geography lived by articulate world views and value systems. The historical religions such as Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam etc. provided elaborate doctrinal frame works wherein ontological, cosmological and axiological questions pertaining to human existence were sought to be answered. For the last three thousand years, man has been living within the parameters of these frame works. His existential questions, his socio-political ideas and his moral do's and don'ts were responded by these world views. However with onset of modernization chiefly heralded by experimental science and technology, the grip of historical religions on human societies has been loosened. Science, although presumably a value free enterprise and methodical integration of the universe, as a matter of fact impinges upon our values beliefs and cultural outlooks and consequently a new civilization pattern emerges with its own normative structure and interests and priorities.

Therefore, contemporary man is caught between his tradition, religion, moorings and modern scientific imperatives. The tradition,

religion, and modern science simultaneously pulls modern mind and compel for his loyalties. Religion traditionally provided him a set of definitions and norms whereby man could a-tune himself to the vast space-time continuum called universe. Science . leads him to technological development but it simultaneously robs him of his spiritual moorings. Thus modern man is on the horns of any self analysis. This has lead to wide spread normlessness and consequently modern man is alienated from himself, from universe and from God.

The construction of mental situation of the present will continue with growing awareness of the limits of the knowledge, on the one hand and of the risks of undue absoluteness, on the other, there will be a tendency to rest content with particular perspectives as representations of the situation. In their particularity they will be valid but they will have no absolute validity.



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C E R T I F I C A T E

Certified that the Ph.D. thesis entitled "The Existentialist Concept of Alienation" is a bonafied research work carried out by Miss Shabnam Ashqi under my supervision. The thesis is her original and independent work and has not been submitted anywhere else. The thesis in its present form is fit for submission for evaluation.

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In writing on this topic I do not claim to understand it but I have experienced it. I have experienced Alienation. I met a very serious road accident in August last (1997). The incomplete thesis was with me and unlike the fatal accident of Albert Camus - the existentialist, I survived. Thanks to utmost care of my physicians, relatives and friends.

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SHABNAM ASHAI

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CHAPTER I

CONCEPT OF MAN IN HISTORICAL RETROSPECT

"What is the nature of man"? is surely one of the most important questions of philosophy. For, whatever questions we raise regarding human situation depend ultimately on our view of human nature, the meaning and purpose of human life, what man ought to do and hopes to achieve etc., are fundamentally affected by whatever one thinks is the real or true nature of man. In the history of western thought, philosophers, scientists and men of letters have sought to know man, either with the dualistic hypothesis or with a monoistic hypothesis. The upholders of the dualistic hypothesis have suggested that man is the unity of two principal components i.e. body and spirit, which though they are logically independent are yet substantially united together as man. On the other hand, the upholders of the monoistic hypothesis considered the real nature of man either as purely spiritual or as purely material.

In ancient Greece Pythagoras was probably the first philosopher¹ to uphold a dualistic hypothesis for explaining the existence of man. For him and his followers man is a composite of body and soul. Soul being the eternal element while body is a temporal phenomenon. Pythagoras believed in transmigration of souls and he was of the view that man is an integral part of cosmos. The soul changes

its bodily forms; sometimes it may appear in human form, sometime in animal form and sometime in plant form. He believed that purity was to be sought by silence, self-examination, abstention from flesh, and the observance of other rituals which the pythagoras interpreted symbolically.

For Plato and Aristotle also man is a composite being constituted by the elements of body and soul². In agreement with Pythagoras Plato was of the view that the soul is eternal and its original home is beyond space and time. Its presence in this world indicates a fall in state. For Plato reality consists of Ideas and these ideas are beyond space and time and they are eternal and unchanging. Soul actually belongs to that realm. The human soul in its fallen state on this earth aspires to reach out again to its original home, the realm of ideas. But at the same time it is bound by the body and its earthly needs often make it forget its real aspirations. So according to Plato there is a built-in tension in the human situation. On the one hand human spirit aspires to fly but on the other hand its bodily weight pulls it down to earth.

What is the true nature of man? Replies Aristotle, "We see it clearest in the most intellectual and most highly socialized life of man"³. Differently expressed, man is by nature intellectual and social; and therefore the ideal life is the life of the philosopher, the life of the

citizen in a free city-state and the life of friendship. For Aristotle every entity of this universe is composed of matter and form; being the actuality and matter being the possibility. So far as man is concerned we can say that soul is the form of man and according to Aristotle every object in this universe aims to achieve its true form. So we can say that according to Aristotle the evolution of a man consists in actualizing his true form i.e. his soul. Aristotle also was of the view that a man cannot realize his true form in a state of loneliness. A man needs the company of other men in order to realize his true self. That is why Aristotle called man a social animal. But by virtue of being a social animal man is also a political animal according to Aristotle. Here again we can discern that there is a tension built-in the very structure of man. On the one hand man is supposed to realize, actualize his own particular true form but on the other hand he is required to seek the help and assistance of others for doing the same⁴.

For Epicurus human organism is composed of atoms undergoing characteristic patterns of change. Like all other atomic compounds man came into being when the necessary conditions have been met. He has no creator and no destiny. His good is pleasure, his highest good is a life of secure and lasting pleasure. According to him men

are not united by any natural bond, they form alliances for mutual advantage⁵.

Coming to modern times; for Descartes man is a composite of body and mind. Both these elements are, as per tradition, conceived to be totally different from one another, the attribute of mind being thought, and the attribute of body being extension. He was of the opinion that a disembodied mind can exist on its own. But the problem with the cartesian idea is how can two essentially different things like body and mind be united? Descartes somehow comes out with a solution that is definitely unsound. He says that the two are related via pineal gland in the brain⁶. Notwithstanding the unsoundness of cartesian solution, we can discern again that there is a built-in tension in the very structure of the human being. The needs of the mind and demands of the body are definitely at variance with each other. And the problem is how to balance and harmonise the two.

John Locke distinguishes the concept of man from the concept of person. A man according to Locke is a certain sort of living organism whose identity depends on its biological organisation. On the other hand, he defined a person as "A thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself at, different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness

Which is inseparable from thinking and essential to it"⁷. A person according to Locke is a morally responsible agent. Locke thought, that what makes people accountable for their actions is their ability to recognise them as their own. This means two things: first, an awareness of what one is doing when one is doing it and, second, an ability to remember having done it. Hence, he said that the criterion for the identity of persons, as distinct from men is consciousness, a concept intended to embrace both awareness and memory. Hence we discern a tension between these two concepts, man and person.

For Nietzsche man has no supernatural dignity. Man's dignity is not a pre-given fact but a goal that few approach. There is no meaning in life except the meaning man gives to his life, and the aims of most men have no surpassing dignity. To raise ourselves above the senseless flux, we must cease being merely human. We must be hard against ourselves and overcome ourselves; we must become creators instead of remaining mere creatures. For Nietzsche human evolution is possible only through, "Suffering, being forsaken, profound self contempt, the torture of mistrust of himself and the misery of him who is overcome"⁸. He is of the view that there is no other way in which one can attain or prove one's worth.

In this regard Ortega y Gasset has rightly pointed out:

The select man is not the petulant person who thinks himself superior to the rest, The most radical division that is possible to make of humanity is that which splits it into two classes of creatures: Those who make great demands of themselves, piling up difficulties and duties; and those who demand nothing special to themselves, but for whom to live is to be every moment what they already are, without imposing on themselves any effort towards perfection; mere buoys that float on the waves.

Thus we see that human condition for Nietzsche is to be torn by strife and a perpetual struggle and flight against one self. Thus alienation is a structural feature of man.

To Marx, man is destined to work for his biophysical survival and for the fulfilment of his other needs. Production is therefore the most important of all man's activities. Man in association with other men produces more than man in isolation and society is thus the result of man's attempt to secure the necessities of life most efficiently. But, society has never accomplished that to the satisfaction of all its members and has, in consequence, always been subject to internal stresses and

strains or subject to division into oppressors and the oppressed. Thus in Marx's view, man's becoming are exclusively the result of his existential socio-economic relativeness.

Marx holds that in the capitalist form of society, man gets alienated from his own true nature, since the conditions of the capitalist society do not allow man to develop his real potential. Thus, in his opinion there can be no real change in the individual's life until there is a radical change in society and unless the socio-economic system of capitalism is topsy-turned. And Marx thinks that this is bound to happen one day, for capitalism will wither away because of its inner contradictions and the communist revolutionary will bring in the new order of things in which alienation will disappear, man will be regenerated in his true nature, his potential will develop for its own sake and the guiding principle in the way and view of life will be "each according to his ability to each according to his needs". In short Marx's man is primarily an economic being and solution to man's all problems and all his suffering consists in restructuring the economic set up. He held that human state is constituted by its material sustenance - "Man is what he eats"⁹.

Freud tried to build a complete picture of man by working out an analysis of his unconscious urges and impulses. Freud's basic thesis is that, nothing what a person does or says is really haphazard or accidental; everything can, in principle, be traced to causes which are somehow in the person's mind¹⁰. Freud postulated three kinds of man's mental states viz. 'conscious' i.e. different kinds of our experiences and memories of which we are usually aware; 'unconscious' i.e. certain kinds of our experiences which cannot become conscious in normal circumstances and 'preconscious' i.e. memories of particular experiences or of particular facts, of which we are not continually conscious, but which we can call to mind whenever necessary. Freud also postulated three major structural systems with the human mind or personality; the id, which contains all the instinctual drives seeking immediate satisfaction, the ego, which deals with the real world outside the person, mediating between it and id and the superego, a special part of the ego which contains the conscience and the social norms acquired in childhood.

Freud further holds that the becoming of a normal human person depends on a harmonious relationship between the various parts of the mind, and between the person and the real world in which he has to live. The ego has to

reconcile id, Super-ego and the external world, perceiving and choosing opportunities for satisfying the instinctual demands of the Id without transgressing the standards required by the super-ego. If the world is unsuitable and does not give any opportunities for satisfaction of the instinctual demands, there will be mental disturbances and hence man's sufferings. So, becoming of imperfect individuals, in Freud's opinion, result from the repression or frustration of basic instincts. And, the prime basic instinct according to Freud is sex or lust. However, he widened the concept of sexuality as pleasant experience derived through any part of the body; even love, sympathy, liking etc. And, finally he held that, for normal and mature development it is essential that each child passes through the normal stages of development of sexuality. Evidently, in Freud's view, man's becoming is primarily governed by his basic instinct of sex.

For Dostoyevsky man is limited by society, economic conditions, laws, history, the Church and espacially by god. He is classified, defined and fixed by a hundred institutions and a thousand conditions. Man, however does not want to be defined and limited, he wants to be free and he wants to be totally free. According to Dostoyvesky he is right in wanting to be free, for freedom is the essential attribute of his identity.

Dostoyevsky's free man must be a revolutionary. He must refuse what society, economics, religion, other people, and his own past have made of him¹¹. Golyadkin, the hero of the early tale *The Double* (1846), refuses to be what society and economic conditions and his own acts have made of him: a civil servant of a certain rank, living on *shetilavochnaya* street with a servant named *Petrushka*; someone not poor and not rich; something of a bootlicker, a bit of hypocrite, and a social bore. He revolts against this Golyadkin by creating a double. By giving all his undesirable traits to the double, he is able to make in his mind a new identity: good, brave, intelligent and heroic. The Golyadkin others see is a mistake; the Golyadkin he cries in his mind is the true one: when the two come into conflict, he defends unto madness his freedom to reject what the past and conditions have made of him and his right to create himself.

However this freedom implies a complex and terrible truth about the actions of men and their treatment of others. If there are no laws to one's nature—and there cannot be if one is to be free — than man alone is his own law. And if he is his own end, he will make everything else serve that end, including other people. Even more, every a-priori truth becomes illusion. Otherwise, the truth would be prior to other choices and

our choices would be determined by it. Truth as something absolute, timeless, and pre-existent to our choices is impossible in Dostoyevsky's concept of freedom. Truth, like everything else in his world depends on our wills. The implications of this are terrifying; every good, beautiful, virtuous, reasonable act is so only in appearance. No matter how much naive and tender romantic souls may want to believe in them, they are really deceptions, for the reality is man's free will and he is in a deadly duel with other free wills.

The total freedom of underground man brought Dostoyevsky to the total terror of a universe without truth or principle, good or evil, virtue or vice. This nihilistic vision of the universe was to send philosophers like L.I. Shestov and Nietzsche into dark ecstasy over the naked power of the will, and it was also to bring Dostoyevsky to what seemed to be an irresolvable dilemma. Freedom is the supreme good because man is not man unless he is free, but freedom is also the supreme evil because man is free to do anything, including illimitable destruction.

For Heidegger human being exists as anticipation of its own possibilities: it exists in advance of itself and

grasps its situation as challenge to its own power of becoming what it may, rather than being what it must be. Man is always reaching out beyond himself; his very being consists in aiming at what he is not yet. Such a project of himself never outruns the boundaries of the world he has been given: it is a projection in and off and with the world. For Heidegger human existence is a shared existence. "I am constituted both by my preoccupations in which I make use of objects as tools and by my solicitude of persons"¹². For him self and world are inseparable. In its own projection, then, man at once understands his world and becomes himself. However, if the world is the material for his creative energy, it is also the agent by which he is seduced from the essential drive to understand and create. Man is not only the world, in his creative efforts he loses himself to the world. According to Heidegger, foreflight is a fundamental attribute of human being. It means the scattering of the essential forward drive through attention to the distracting and disturbing cares of every day and of the things and people that surround us every-day. Thus the forward driving, "I" is sacrificed to the persistent and pressing "They". Man, for Heidegger in its everyday mode is public; it is life with others and for others, in alienation from the central task of becoming oneself. Thus man is determined yet free, free

yet enslaved. It is not the case that only heredity and environment make man, these are conversely what man makes of them. Freedom lives in the tension of history, in the challenge of man's situation, his body, his family, his country. But freedom lives equally in the tension of the unhistorical, the purely present - the passing mood, the flight of the self from itself.

To Sartre man is free as he cannot be otherwise. He cannot escape his freedom, which becomes for him, therefore, a dreadful responsibility. But not only does one determine himself in his free choice; he also determines all others for every decision he makes legislates for all men¹³. Man is involved inevitably in anguish because his decision is never grounded in an external authority upon which he can rest the responsibility for his action. He must bear it alone. And when Sartre says alone, for not only is there no God to share the burden, but there is no structure a-priori for values to rest upon. Man's forlornness is his all aloneness in which he must face the issue of his own freedom. That God does not exist is a dreadful fact that makes an ultimate difference to the world and to man.

The discovery that there is no God and that man is alone is the beginning of a genuine humanism that

dignifies man as the free creator of all values and of whatever meaning there is in human existence. Sartre holds: "There is no human nature which can be taken as foundational. Man is nothing else but what he purposes, he exists only, in so far as he realises himself; he is therefore, nothing else but the sum of his actions, nothing else but what his life is"¹⁴.

He asserts that: "What man needs is to find himself again and to understand that nothing can save him from himself, not even a valid proof of the existence of God"¹⁵.

For Iqbal too existence is a continuous process and not a system. His philosophy is based upon a theory of man. He regards human existence as an open reality. Iqbal agrees with the existentialists that the traditional philosophy has failed to grasp the very reality of human existence because of its intellectualistic analytical approach. Man is unanalysable, unpredictable and free, always an open possibility. His philosophy maintains that man is never complete.

"Take this message from me to the Sufis: Ye are seeking God through the subtleties of thought; I shall serve as a slave the man who worships himself and who sees God in the light of his own personality"¹⁶.

Iqbal holds that man is the goal of life's carvan. He is self-contained, centre of activity, creative and self-evolving. In defiance of God, Iqbal's man is destined to be a rival creator addressing 'The best of all creators':

Thou didst create the night and I made the lamp.

Thou didst create clay and I made the cup.

Thou didst create the deserts, mountains and forests.

I produced the orchards, gardens and groves;

It is I who turn stone into a mirror.

And it is I who turn poison into an antidote¹⁷.

Iqbal emphasises two essential attributes of man viz. freedom and creativity. He also touched the problem of two fold alienation - God alienated from man and man alienated from God. In 'Shikwa' (The complaint), Iqbal had already raised the same issue: why is man alienated from God? In 'Jawab-e-Shikwa' (Answer to the complaint) Gods reply seems to be not satisfactory, because alienation is not God's problem; it is exclusively human problem. Iqbal considered it an opportunity to unfold man's all possibilities and develop all his potentialities. It was for him, freedom and creativity that urged man to leave the innert static life of heaven, devoid of all passions

and activities. Hence social life is not opposed to religious life, but an integral part of it. Social and Religious experiences form the totality of human existence. It is due to this approach that Iqbal could meet the challenge of social meaninglessness and religious alienation simultaneously on the level of existential experiences.

Man evolves his own world, creates his own values. If the present world renders no meaning to human existence, it is to be destroyed and reshaped:

Smash the world into pieces if it does not suit thee; And bring forth another world from the depths of thy being. It is irritating for a free man to live in a world made by others¹⁸.

Iqbal holds that:

In the higher Sufism of Islam unitive experience is not the finite ego effacing its own identity by some sort of absorption into the infinite ego; it is rather the infinite passing into the loving embrace of the finite¹⁹.

Finitude is not a misfortune. Islam does not teach complete liberation from finitude²⁰. Man is the trustee of a free personality at his peril²¹. Freedom is man's own choice. He is neither condemned to be free, nor does he

receive freedom as a gift from the transcendence. To Iqbal God speaks through freedom. He does not regard a slave's prayer as genuine, because a slave is not free to communicate with God. Prayer is the means to attain immortality. Only a free being can transcend space-time limits. Freedom means self-transcendence to be what a man is not at present. It is creativity.

Iqbal holds that being is always individual, there is not universal being. By being he means life of ego.

Augustine recognizes three planes of being: body, soul and God. As soul controls body, so does God control the soul, to what He is in the closest proximity²². For Saint Augustine man's evidence for knowing that he himself exists functions as a pre-condition. According to him, man can soundly affirm his own existence on the ground of the famous formula, repeated in one form or another in several of his works, *Si faller, sum*, "If I am deceived, I exist".

Through the inner empirical method, man can realize that he possesses reason and that this possession makes him superior to inorganic beings, plants and animals. Also through inner empiricism man can not only recognise his own mutability, but can as well realize the existence of the immutable and unchanging; that which is

Superior to himself. Saint Augustine cannot see in this truth anything other than God, who has granted men these inner powers, this Divine illumination, whereby God himself can be known, and all the complex relations of the creation can be understood. Thus the mind can know that God is the creator of the "natures" which can be perceived in the world of sense-experience and they in turn can be dealt with in their true character, because inner experience with its guarantee of Divine illumination makes it possible for the mind to view them on their proper lights.²³

To Augustine man's free will is the source of man's imperfection but man was capable of being perfect. Man, not God is responsible; and he is so, even if God foresaw that free man would sin.²⁴

Man has fallen, and with man's fall evil has entered the world. In Adam all men sinned, i.e. Adam's sin was not a mere event in the life of one man but was a cosmic revolution, a world rebelling against its creator. With the fall man was lost. Man is lost and no human power can save him. Left to himself, man can but sin, for his true freedom has gone. God alone can save man by His grace. Man must be redeemed and God alone can redeem him. The world is evil and is lost; men are evil still, hundreds of years after the Christ has come. Such is not

the divine plan. God chooses whom he shall save and whom he shall leave to their sin. But is not salvation free to all to choose or not to choose ? No; man cannot even choose to be saved, for man is hopelessly corrupt. If he is saved, it is all Gods will. The agent by which this salvation is consummated is the grace of God working through the church. Without the church there is no means of salvation. Thus the church is conceived not as a society within the world but as a wonderful cosmic entity coming from God having supreme control over the destiny of man. It is thus superior to the state and to all other human institutions. It is the city of God descended from heaven. The church and the angels constitute the great intermediary between the ultimate God and the cosmos; and they thus correspond to the intermediary powers and stages believed in by the whole intellectual world of the Greco-Roman period.

For Augustine the choice for a man was always between a life of detached action or an over-indulgence into the ways of flesh and carnal desires. One was the life of heroic withdrawl and consequent self-exaltation and redemption while the other was the life of slavery of lust and sensual pleasure. The antipodal stations of life could be expressed by any of the contrasting terms like 'City of God' and "City of Earth or City of Rome and City of

Jerusalem etc." While elaborating on the significance of these dichotomies, at one place he movingly wrote :

"....ye have heard and know that there are two cities, for the present outwardly mingled together, yet separated at heart, running together through the course of time until the end; one whose end is everlasting peace, and it is called Jerusalem; the other whose joy is peace in the world, and is called Babylon. The meaning of these names too ye remember, that Jerusalem means 'vision of peace'; Babylon, 'Confusion' Jerusalem was held captive in Babylon, but not all for the Angels too are its citizens. But as regards men predestined to the glory of God....which began thus :

For thee, O God, a hymn is meet in Sion, and to thee shall be vow be performed in Jerusalem. But today we have sun, By the waters of Babylon we sat down and wept, when he remembered Sion. Observe, that in the former it is said, For thee, O God, a hymn is meet in Sion; but her, by the waters of Babylon we sa-t down and wept, when we remembered Sion, that Sion where a hymn is meet for God.²⁵

According to Ibn 'Arabi', man consists of three elements : Spirit, soul and body. The three aspects of the soul are the rational, vegetative and animal. The rational soul Ibin 'Arabi seems to identity with spirit or the

rational principle in man. The purpose of the vegetative soul is to seek food and to assimilate it. The animal soul has its seat in the physical heart and is shared by man and animals. It represents their vital principle. Both vegetative and animal soul Ibn 'Arabi regards as part of the body. The rational soul, on the other hand is independent of the body, even though it uses it as a vehicle. It is 'that perfect and simplest substance which is living and active, the substance whose sole activities are remembering, retaining, ideas, comprehending, discriminating and reflecting.²⁶

Viewed superficially, Ibn 'Arabi's division into spirit and body (rationality and animality) might wear a look of dualism. In actual fact both spirit and body are, for him, facets of the same central Reality, one being its inward, the other its outward aspect.

Actually Ibn 'Arabi transformed Hallaj's theory of incarnation which states that "God created Adam in his own image". He distinguished between two natures of man : the divine (al-lahut) and the human (al-nasut). The two nature are not united but fused, the one into the other, as wine is fused into water. The Hallajian idea was given a wider application by Ibn Arabi. First, the duality of lahut and Nasut became a duality of aspects of one reality, not of

two independent natures. Secondly they were regarded as actually present not only in man but in everything whatever; the Nasut being the external aspect of a thing, the lahut, its internal aspect. But God who reveals Himself in all phenomenal existence is revealed in a most perfect and complete way in the form of the perfect man, who is best represented by prophets and saints.

So man in general-and the perfect man in particular is the most perfect manifestation of God. The universe which, like a mirror, reflects the divine attributes and names in a multiplicity of forms, manifests them separately. Man alone manifests these attributes and names collectively. Hence he is called the microcosm and the honoured epitome (al-mukhtasar al-Sharif) and the most universal being (al-Kaun al Jami) who comprises all realities and grades of existence. In him alone the divine presence is reflected, and through him alone God become conscious of himself and his perfection.

Ibn 'Arabi says :

"God, glory to Him, in respect of His most beautiful names, which are beyond enumeration, willed to see their a'yan (realities), or if you wish you may say, His (own) 'ayn, in a universal Being which contains the

whole affair in as much as it is endowed with all aspects of existence and through which (alone) His mystery is revealed to Himself : for a vision which consists in a thing seeing itself by means of itself is not the same as that of the thing seeing something else which serves as a mirror....Adam was the very essence of the polishing of this mirror, and the spirit of this form (i.e., the form in which God has revealed Himself : which is man)"²⁷.

Man deserves the high honour and dignity of being God's vicegerent on earth - a rank which God has denied all other creatures including the angels. This superior rank goes not to every individual man, for some men are even lower than the beasts, but to the perfect man alone, and this for two reasons :

- a) He is perfect manifestation of God in virtue of unity in himself, or all God's attributes and names.
- b) He knows God absolutely through realizing in some sort of experience his essential oneness with him.²⁸

According to Buddha, the idea of self is an imaginary, false belief which has no corresponding reality and it produces harmful thoughts of 'me' and 'mine', selfish desire, craving, attachment, hatred, ill-health, conceit, pride egoism and other defilements, impurities, and problems. It is the source of all troubles in the

world from personal conflicts to wars between nations. In short, to this false view can be traced all the evil in the world.

The Buddhist doctrine of anatta, with the rejection of the notion of the immortal soul within man, serves to dispel the illusion of the egocentric 'I', which is, as Buddha taught, the root cause of all evil. To Buddha "There is no self in man, however spelt or described, which is unchanging and his alone". The self or soul exists as a convenient concept to describe an ever-changing bundle of characteristics, each the product of innumerable past causes, which moves in the illusion of time towards Nirvana²⁹. The Buddha analyses the components of personality and proved each to be empty. In the first place Buddhism examines the various aspects of the so called person (Puggata) and contends, by minutely analysing them, that none of them can be identified with the atman, and that no atman can be found when the person is so analysed.

The person is first analysed under two categories : Nama and Rupa. Nama (literally Name), is usually translated into English by the word 'mind', but in Buddhist psychology it is used as a collective name to refer to the psychological and mental aspects of human being. Rupa (literally form), translated into a English by the word

(matter, body), is also a collective term to describe the physical aspect of being. Thus Namarputa (Name and Form) taken together comprise the psychophysical organism which constitutes a person as a separate and distinct individual.

It is extremely important to note that Buddhism does not think of Nama and Rupa in dualistic terms. They are interdependent and belong to each other in an integral manner. One cannot exist without the other. The idea is expressed in the following verse :

As a pair are mind and body both
To one another a support;

As soon as one of them dissolves,
The other too does disappear....

As men are able with a ship
To cross the waters of the sea,
Just so supported by this body
The mind keeps going on and on.

And just as with the help of men
The ship may cross the mighty sea
Just so supported by the mind
The body may be keeping on.

As men and ship traverse the sea,
Depending on each others' help.

So are the mind and body too,
 Each other they support and help.³⁰

The division of man into the two categories, Nama and Rupa, is only the first step in the Buddhist analysis of self. The next step is the analysis of man into the five Khandhas (aggregation). This is the classic 'thervada pancakkhandha' theory, according to which the individual consists of (1) Rupa, (2) Vedana, (3) Sanna, (4) Samkhara and (5) Vinnana. The last four are sub-divisions of Nama.

Altogether there are eighty-one basic elements with the addition of the element of space (Akaso) which is counted as one of the rupa elements. None of these elements is permanent. Hence there is no soul, when the five aggregates come together they take a certain form and what is thus formed is given a name. Thus we have 'name and form' (nama-rupa) but when the elements disintegrate there is no nama-rupa, no person, no ego.

Regarding the impersonality and emptiness of the five aggregates it is said :

Whatever there is of corporeality, feeling, perception, mental formation and consciousness, whether past, present or future, one's own or external, gross or subtle, lofty or low, far or near; this, one should

understand according to reality and true wisdom : This does not belong to me, This I am not, this is not my Ego.

However, besides the above discussed conflicting theories, on concept of man, there are certain systems of belief e.g., Christianity, Islam, Hinduism etc., which are embodied in man's ways of living in different parts of the world. They being practically lived and adopted, are thus more than mere theories. These systems of belief claim essential truth about human nature e.g. Christianity holds that man is made in the image of God. For each man is free to accept or reject God's purpose and will be judged according to how he exercises this freedom. To the question as to why God created man, Christianity answers that God willed not to be alone. He wanted to realise His essence i.e. love in meeting with another being, man, through its own free love. To account for man's sufferings and problems, Christianity says that the world is not in accordance with God's purpose, that man's relationship to God is disrupted. Man misuses his freedom, he rejects God and is thus infected with Sin.

On the other hand, in Indian culture there are various trends on concept of man. The Charvakas, for example, like materialists, hold that man is a bio-physical

entity, who has evolved from matter. In their opinion, enjoyment of pleasure is the only sensible purpose of life. Mahayana Buddhism (Vijnanavadins) treats 'consciousness' as the metaphysical essence of man, whereas to the Hinayana school, man is aggregate of five Skandhas i.e. Sensation, consciousness, Name, impression and Form. However, other schools of Indian Philosophy along with Jainism regard man as a unity of two sides i.e. the 'Natural' and the 'spiritual'. By 'natural' is meant the biophysical and psychological processes stemming from the body-mind complex and the 'spiritual', the real essence of man which is self-explanatory. Further, man as a unity of these two sides, has been understood as characterised by the unique 'I' - feeling'. This unreflective 'I feeling' explains man's identification with the body-mind complex and things of the external world.

According to Indian thought the basic factor behind man's coming into wordly existence and becoming of a certain kind of human person, is his own Karmas of the past lives and of the present life. There is a two-fold fructification of all Karmas in man's life. Firstly every action performed with a desire produces its direct results, the direct results of our past Karmas is that, they determine the nature of birth, family, society, position

etc. In this case there is no choice. But, our past deeds also produce indirect results in us i.e. tendencies or dispositions, (Sanskaras or Vasans) which promote us to act in certain ways. But, they do not compel. They may be checked and controlled. Thus according to Indian religiophilosophical thought, inspite of the initial determination of man's present life, man can make attempts to shape himself as he wills.

Islamic philosophy of man is also set within semitic frame-work. The Quran maintains that man has been created with a view to realize certain values and standards, the fore-most value being man's complete surrender to the will of Allah. Allah created man in His own image. He inducted His own spirit into a clay model and thus the most conscious and self-conscious agent viz. Man was created. Allah is nearer to man than his own jugular vein. Man was precisely created to celebrate the praises of Almighty Allah and thus achieve highest spiritual excellence and felicity. Man has to go through trails and tribulations but he must not despair of the mercy of God. Ultimately it is the believer in Allah who is really successful and on the day of judgement, he will be judiciously and graciously rewarded by His creator and Master i.e. Allah.

As a whole, what may be concluded from the above discussion is that the Dharma-centric theories of the traditional thinkers are as mistaken as the Kama-centric theory of Freud and the Artha-centric theory of Marx in understanding the nature of man. These approaches are limited and fail to understand man in his total perspective. They try to understand man from the same single aspect i.e. of the nature of Kama or Artha or Dharma or from some metaphysical presuppositions and as a result, their conclusions veil not only other dimensions of man but also the wholeness of man. These theories at the most, attempt to give a description of what man is, they do not take into account all dimensions of man and more particularly, the aspiring dimension of man i.e. what man wants to be or seeks to be. But then, any theory of human nature, if it is true to itself, has to be a theory of human life, not of one part, or one aspect of life. Neither can it be a mere logical postulation or speculation of an individual life or of human species. It has to be a complete explanation of the human mode of being and existence.

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM OF ALIENATION

Man has never been such a problem to himself as in the present age. Present age is a Self-conscious age. The deepest problems of modern life justify the claim of an individual to preserve the autonomy and individuality of his existence in the face of crushing social forces, historical heritage, cultural ethos and above all technocentric life-world. In the act of fleeing with nature which primitive man has to wage for his bodily existence attains in this modern form its latest transformation. The eighteenth century called upon man to free himself of all historical bonds in politics and religion and in morals and economics. In addition to greater liberty, the nineteenth century demanded the functional specialization of man and his work. This specialization makes one individual incomparable to another, and each of them indispensable to the highest possible extent.

Our present age of pessimism, despair and uncertainty follows a quite different earlier period of optimism, hope and certainty - a period when man believed in himself and the work of his hands; had faith in the powers of reason and science, trusted his gods, and conceived his own capacity for growth as endless and his widening horizons

limitless. Bold in his desires of freedom, equality, social - justice and brotherhood, he thought that ignorance alone stood in the way of these desires. But conflict of emotions and violence have unseated traditional beliefs and values. Knowledge has spread, but it has not abolished warfare; nor has it made all men brothers. Instead, men find themselves more isolated, anxious and uneasy than ever.

Confused as to his place in the scheme of a world growing each day closer yet more impersonal, more densely populated yet in face to face relations more dehumanized; a world appealing ever more widely for his concern and sympathy with unknown masses of men, yet fundamentally alienating him even from his next neighbour, today man has become mechanized, made comfortable as an object but in the profound sense displaced and thrown off balance as a subjective creator and power. Modern man is neither nostalgic to his past nor optimistic about future; he is just dissatisfied with 'present' - i.e. every thing that makes up his ethos - his philosophy and science, his religion and technology, his politics and ethics etc. He is disoriented, uncommitted, cynical, hopeless and what not.¹ This entire cluster of modern attitudes is what we call ALIENATION. The word alienation has an ancient history, being used in common discourse to identify feelings of

estrangement, or of detachment from self and from others; and in law to describe the act of transferring property or ownership to another. Actually the term alienation implies a subject and an object - the former being a constant and the latter being a variable. The subject, i.e., the alienated, individual and the object what one is alienated from, that may be an individual's self, another person, any institution, the whole society or cosmos or even God.

In modern terms, however, "Alienation" has been used by philosophers, psychologists, men of literature and sociologists to refer to an extraordinary variety of psycho-social disorders; including loss of self-anxiety states, psychosis, despair, depersonalization rootlessness, apathy, social disorganization, loneliness, atomization, powerlessness, meaninglessness, isolation, pessimism and the loss of beliefs or values. Theologians and philosophers warn that advances in scientific knowledge do not enable us to penetrate the mystery of Being and do not bridge but often widen the gulf between the knower and the reality he tries to understand; psychiatrists try to help their patients return from the world of illusion to reality; critics of the increasing mechanization of life challenge the optimistic expectation that technological progress will automatically lead to the enrichment of human lives; political scientists note that even democratic institutions

have failed to bring about genuine participation by the masses in the great issues of our period.²

Whatever the approach, central to definition of alienation is the idea that man has lost his identity or "Selfhood". Many writers who deal with the problems of "Self-alienation" assume that in each of us there is a "genuine", "real" or "spontaneous" self which we are prevented from knowing or achieving.³ But how does one achieve selfhood? The most satisfactory answer has been provided by Social Psychologists, notably Charles H. Cooley and George H. Mead, who argued that one acquires a self or identity through interaction with others. Cooley called this a process of acquiring a "looking-glass self" and Mead termed it "taking the role of the other". But if one acquires a self by communicating with others, especially through language, then anxiety about or loss of self-hood is a social as well as an individual problem. What this means is that the person who experiences self-alienation is not only cut off from the springs of which he would otherwise be a part, and who fails to achieve a meaningful relationship with others but he is deprived of some part of himself.

Simmel, who has considerably influenced contemporary philosophy and sociology both in Europe and in the United States, has expressed in his works the mood of

skepticism which arose in the first decades of this century. His essay "Der Konflikt der Modernen Kultur" reflects the growing fear - in our day reiterated by the existentialists - that man cannot be himself.⁴ He is destined to remain a stranger in the world in which he lives.

According to Simmel, an inner conflict, stemming from the antagonism between life and form, can be seen in the development of most civilizations. The creative movement of life in a civilization tends to express itself in law, technology, art, science and religion. Although the purpose of these expressions is to implement and to protect the life which generated them, they reveal an immanent tendency to follow a direction, independent of and divorced from the energies of life which brought them into being. At the moment of their emergence they might correspond to the life which created them; but as they unfold they appear to fall into unyielding disconnection, even into a state of opposition. They are bound to become rigid, to stand by themselves. Thus they tend to acquire continuity in a word they become Forms.

Without these forms the creative life could not have become manifest. It continuously produces them. Yet it keeps on flowing like a ceaseless stream, forever producing new forms but immediately opposing them in their

solidity and permanence. Thus, rapidly or slowly, the energies of life gnaw at every cultural formation, once it has emerged. As one formation evolves its successor develops beneath it and eventually, after a short or a lengthy struggle, replaces it.

This perennial opposition between life and form - Simmel believes for reasons which he does not analyze - is intensified and enhanced in our age. For Simmel the cult of life has deeply influenced the philosophical outlook of our age. He sees every period in history as producing one specific idea which dominates that era as its secret king⁵. In classical Greece this Specific idea was the idea of Being; in the middle ages, the Idea of God; in Renaissance, (14th - 16th centuries), the idea of Nature; and in the seventeenth century, the idea of Natural law. During the eighteenth century the Individual becomes the central theme; and in the twentieth century the concept of Life excels all others in its appeal to us and its influence upon our outlook.

To show that the conflict between Form and Life has reached even the most personal and intimate aspects of human relations, Simmel describes the development of attitudes towards sex under the impact of modern civilization. There are many such reflections of contemporary man's fear that his individuality will be destroyed, that he is living under

conditions which compel him to become estranged from his own self. There are numerous indications that this apprehension is one of the decisive forces in the thinking of modern man and that accounts for the strong appeal of existential philosophy. Individual should become that which he is, even if this commitment to his own self, to his "authentic existence", means that he had to accept the fate of the lonely "outsider"⁶.

Existential philosophy is essentially a revolt against the belief deeply rooted in the development of modern thought, that truth can be ascertained only through detachment, that the cognitive act requires a radical separation between the knower, represented as the subject, and the reality to be known, represented as the object. Already in the nineteenth century there could be heard the voices of a few lonely thinkers who recognized the danger lying in the split between subject and object. Kierkegaard expressed his disdain for the merely "cognitive subject", whom he confronted with the existential thinker. He argued that "knowledge has a relationship to the knower, who is essentially an existing individual, and that for this reason all essential knowledge is essentially related to existence". A thinker as different from Kierkegaard as Feuerbach insisted : "Do not wish to be a philosopher in contrast to being a man..... do not think as a

thinker..... think as a living, real being..... think
in Existence⁷.

Among the first to concern themselves with self-alienation as a general condition were Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in their respectively despairing and angry tracts about the nothingness or selflessness that yawned before men in a technological, secular, and materialistic society. Thus Kierkegaard who felt that the self could only be preserved by identification with God, spoke of godless man's essential dread at being dominated by an alien power which threatens our dissolution - by which he meant anxiety that loss of self can produce. Despair about loss of self he called a "sickness unto Death". Nietzsche however, proclaimed the death of the gods but asked, "Do we not now wander through an endless nothingness?" More recently Karl Jaspers has written : "what, in all the millenniums of human history and pre-history, no god has been able to do for man, man has done for himself. It is natural enough that in these achievements of his he should discern the true inwardness of being - until he shrinks back in alarm from the void he has made for himself". The problem which Jaspers raises is whether man can preserve his selfhood or identity in a world dominated by a grand technological and bureaucratic "apparatus" of his own creation, yet alien to him. The price we pay for "progress", he suggests, is anxiety, "a dread of

life perhaps unparalleled in its intensity" and increasing "to such a pitch that the sufferer may feel himself to be nothing more than a lost point in empty space, in as much as all human relationships appear to have no more than a temporary validity"⁸.

Husserl differentiated, between existentia and essentia and it became a gripping message for an age that had grown aware of the separation between subject and object. Husserl is concerned with essences and our knowledge of them. It is true, Husserl says, that we cannot reach them by means of sensory perception. But he suggests that we liberate ourselves from the positivistic prejudice which recognizes only those experiences as valid that have been acquired by sensory perception. If we overcome this narrowness Husserl says, we shall realize that essences can be made experienceable, that they can be grasped and "seen" intuitively. This visualization of essences has nothing to do with a sudden revelation and is not an easy task. It can be achieved by difficult preparation, which Husserl calls phenomenological reduction. The objective of phenomenological reduction is to suspend all consideration of the existing world to put the factual into brackets. This can be achieved, Husserl believes, because man's mind has the power to differentiate between existentia and essentia, to set aside existences, and to attain pure consciousness

of essences.

It was hoped that in the intuitive grasping of essences a way had been found to bridge the gulf between subject and object, but soon it was felt unsatisfactory as Hesserls program did not help to bridge the gap between man's mind and the outside world. Existential philosophers opposed Husserl's separation of essence and existences, his claim that we can grasp the essence of objects regardless of whether they actually exist. They emphasized that the concept of essence is a static one and can be applied only to those forms of reality which are characterized by a fixed and unchangeable nature. All attempts to describe man by explaining his essence will result in reducing him to a thing, as evidenced by Descarte's definition of man as *res cogitans*, a thing that thinks. Such an approach overlooks the fact that man differs from an object in that he is not predetermined by properties but creates himself through his qualities, he is what he spontaneously decides to be.

Though the leading exponents of existential philosophy differ in many of their ideas, they all stress the view that human self does not coincide with the individual's basic properties. Human being is capable of breaking away from and transcending its own properties, and

even external conditions of its environment. In his essay "La Republique du Silence", Sartre has written a few sentences which not only describe the attitude of his countrymen during the Nazi occupation of France but convey at the same time the indeterministic orientation of existentialist thought :

We were never more free than during the German occupation. We had lost all our rights, beginning with the right to talk. Everyday we were insulted to our faces and had to take it in silence. Under one pretext or another, as workers, Jews or Political prisoners, we were deported EN MASSE. Every where, on billboards, in the newspapers on the screen, we encounter the revolting and insipid picture of ourselves that our oppressors wanted us to accept. And, because all of this, we were free. Because the Nazi venom spread even into our thoughts, every accurate thought was a conquest. Because an all-powerful police tried to force us to hold our tongues, every word took on the value of a declaration of principles. Because we were hunted down, every one of our gestures had the weight of a solemn commitment..... And the Choice that each of us made of his size and of his being was an authentic choice because it was made face to face with death, because it could always have been expressed in these terms : "Rather death than" And here I am not speaking of the elite among us who were real

Resistants, but of all Frenchmen who, every hour of the night and day throughout four years, answered no Thus the basic questions of liberty itself was posed, and we were brought to the verge of the deepest knowledge that man can have of himself. For the secret of a man is not his inferiority complex : it is the limit of his own liberty, his capacity for resisting torture and death⁹.

Ortega Y Gasset, has stated that the static meaning of the term "to be" makes it entirely inadequate to describe man's existence. We cannot say, he insists, that man "is" but only that he is on the way to be this or that¹⁰. This formulation expresses well the meaning of the existentialists view that the core of man's existence is possibility. For them existence is being which in every movement transcends itself, which since it is directed toward the future, is constantly in advance of itself. Thus they consider man's existence as his concern to become what he is and to be what he has to become. Heidegger and also the French existentialists proclaim the paradox that man, in order to exist, has to throw himself towards his own being. Therefore they call his existence a project and that project has nothing to do with a conscious or rationally designed plan : instead it indicates that man's existence has to move beyond itself in order to move towards itself.

And if existence is nothing but possibility, man's destiny is a hard one. At every moment he faces various alternatives between which he has to choose. This constitutes his freedom, but it thrusts upon him a frightening burden of responsibility. He is forced into cruel situations, in which a decision for any of the various possibilities will reveal the close relationship between freedom and quiet. Thus man does not cherish his sovereignty, which not only enables but compels him to make his own choices. He feels himself condemned to be free (Sartre). He tries to avoid a state of being in which he must ceaselessly decide for himself. But when man seeks to evade the decisions with which he is faced, he is really attempting to escape from his own self. He tries to escape what he cannot escape..... what he is¹¹. Yet so deep is his anguish that he feels himself driven to slip away into a world in which he is not any longer committed to his own self but can follow the choices of "the others", of that anonymous collective which is called "they". This is a totally depersonalized way of being, so general and inarticulate that Heidegger characterizes it by using the German pronoun man i.e. fallen state of mans – a most impersonal and neutral term, meaning "one of many" or day-to-day being. It is well fitted to reveal the innermost nature of a world where every-one is "the other one" and nobody is his own self, and where the meaning of the

personal pronoun has been lost to such an extent that statement like "I think", "I prefer", "I act" have become empty forms¹².

Heidegger believes that if man tends to flee from himself and to plunge from the height of solitude into the public lowlands of the many we should not see in this fall a descent into inquietude and crisis. Quite the contrary : "to exist simply as one of the many" exercises a profoundly appeasing influence as if everything was in the best order¹³. Tempting as this appeasement is, man cannot obtain it without paying a high price. He must cease to be himself, he must become estranged from his own self, that is authentic self.

Heidegger and most of the existential philosophers offer us a more gloomy picture of human existence. Man is alienated from reality, as the result of a split between subject and object which detached knowledge does not heal but deepens. He is estranged from himself, because in flight from himself he lets his existence be thrust down into the inauthenticity of the anonymous crowd. The alienated person is out of touch with himself as he is out of touch with any other person.

History offers plentiful evidence that men in times past also felt no small uncertainty about themselves and their identities, suffered no little anguish of gloom, despair and feelings of detachment from each other. Karl Jaspers quotes an Egyptian chronicler of four thousand years age: "Robbers abound No one ploughs the land. People are saying: "We do not know what will happen from day to day Dirt prevails everywhere, and no longer does any one wear clean raiment The country is spinning round and round like a potter's wheel..... slave - women are searing necklaces of gold and lapis lazuli No more do we hear any one laugh..... Great men and small agree in saying : 'would that I had never been born' No public office stands open where it should, and the, masses are like timid sheep without a shepherd.... Artists have ceased to play their art.....the few stay the many..... one who yesterday was indigent is now wealthy, and the sometime rich over-whelm him with adulation..... Impudence is rife..... Oh that man could cease to be, that women should no longer conceive and give birth. Then, at length, the world would find peace"¹⁴.

We see a similar moral collapse in Greece during the peloponnesian war. As for medieval Europe, Huizinga reminds us that the middle ages were essentially violent in

character: wars, class - struggles, hysterical crowd behaviour, vice and crime, plagues, scarcity, superstition, the conviction that the world was coming to an end - such was the "black" background of medieval life. A late medieval-fifteenth century French poet, Eustache Deschamps, cried:

Why are times so dark
 Men know each other not at all,
 But governments quite clearly change
 From bad to worse?
 Days dead and gone were more worth while
 Now that holds sway? Deep gloom and Boredom,
 Justice and law nowhere to be found
 I know no more where I belong.

I know no more where I belong. Is this not the alienated lament of all ages.

Lewis Mumford writes, "The unattached person during the middle Ages was one either condemned to exile or doomed to death: if alive, he immediately sought to attach himself, at least to a band of robbers. To exist, one had to belong to an association: a house-hold, a manor, a monastery, a guild; there was no security except in association, and no freedom that did not recognize the obligations of a corporate life. One lived and died in the style of one's class and corporation". Moreover, as Herbert Muller notes,

"Men had known a kind of psychological security; they took for granted all the actual insecurity of life in a vale of tears"¹⁵.

It is the historical emergence of individual as we know him, of man alone, that makes alienation so crucially a modern problem. In the past, men felt anxiety or despair particularly when they lost the status that identified them and offered them some security. But when the medieval system collapsed, the likelihood of alienation increased appreciably. Indeed, only with the release of the individual from medieval bonds could alienation become a widespread social problem. "The breakdown of the feudal order forced man to fall back upon himself; he had to learn how to cope with countless problems and decisions that were once taken care of by worldly and spiritual hierarchies. But together with the anxieties generated by this new autonomy he sensed a great promise, for in the period of the formation of the national state and the development of a mercantile economy his own future seemed to have infinite possibilities. At the end of the curve, in our own century, he begins to feel threatened by the encroachment of powerful social forces emanating not only from his own corner of the earth but from every part of a contracting world"¹⁶.

Historically one of the first major results of mechanization was to transform labour; what had formerly been an integral part of human life became a means to an end. To feed and operate the machines of the new civilization required not just raw materials but "free" labour. Since industrialism was pioneered by capitalists this meant a special kind of freedom. And for a man to be treated as commodity a brutal operation was required; the "freeing" of labour from traditional bonds of craft, family and community. Thus one of the many tragic ironies of the early capitalist market economy was that men expected it to automatically lead to general welfare. By a complex interplay of economic and technological imperatives the community was slowly and steadily broken apart into mutually exclusive segments of action or spheres of operation.

When labour became a mechanically regulated commodity, man lost a part of himself. This turns us to the major theme of Alienation; for as Karl Marx saw it, the worker; having lost control over both the conditions of his labour and the fruit of his labour, become alienated from himself.¹⁷ Marx described the existence of contemporary man as largely shaped by the rise and dominant influence of commodity exchange. He considered the commodity to be the most elementary form of modern wealth and gave it a central

position in his analysis of the economic and social features of capitalism. Once commodity production has become the universal mode, all of man's economic activities and processes will centre around it. Its main feature, exchange value, will reach out beyond the merely economic realm and penetrate the whole of human existence¹⁸. Marx also asserts: "we are excluded from true property because our property excludes the other man"¹⁹. The Idea of Alienation, however, Marx had borrowed from Hegel, who 'conceived' it chiefly in metaphysical terms and who described it as a general human condition. Hegel wrote of "Spirit" as "at war with itself"; in consequence, it "has to overcome itself as its (own) most formidable obstacle. That development which in the sphere of Nature is a peaceful growth, is (for the) spirit, a severe, a might conflict with itself. What spirit really strives for is the realization of its Ideal being; but in doing so, it hides that goal from its own vision, and is proud and well-satisfied in this alienation" For Hegel, therefore, man's own intellectual creations become independent of their creator and hence alien to him. Human achievement is a dialectical process in which man can advance to higher forms only by mastering himself and the cultural forces that he creates. Therefore, the history of man is a history of his alienation or frustration.

While Hegel saw alienation as a metaphysical problem, Marx gave it a sociological frame of reference. In his essay of 1844 he wrote that under the system of private property the worker was alienated from the product of his labour and also from the means of production - both of which had become things "not belonging to him". The worker thus separated from his product is alienated from himself, since his labour is no longer his own but the property of another. Finally he is alienated from other men, since his chief link with them now is the commodities they exchange or produce. This process alienates worker from nature. This results in self-estrangement, estrangement with his product and society. In order to find himself he has to destroy the capitalist society.

The industrial revolution and its subsequent transformation of human labour into a commodity are among the major alienating forces in the capitalist world. To administer their complex technology and labour markets men developed elaborate social structures or bureaucracies which were no less impersonal in their effects than machines. Indeed, that was their aim; and they attempted further to "rationalize" the conduct of human affairs by subjecting it to rules, regulations and a hierarchy as described by Maxweber. Thus modern age has enormously tried to grope alien forces over men. Marx's analysis of the new

conditions of labour under capitalism was complemented half a century later by Weber's studies of bureaucracy. Weber thought that bureaucracy became particularly appropriate for capitalism because "the more bureaucracy 'depersonalizes' itself, the more completely it succeeds in achieving the exclusion of love, hatred, and very purely personal, especially irrational and incalculable feeling from the execution of official tasks. In the place of the old-type ruler who is moved by sympathy, favour, grace and gratitude, modern culture requires for its sustaining external apparatus the emotionally detached, and hence rigorously 'professional' expert"²⁰.

How industrial and bureaucratic machines alienate men can be seen clearly in modern conditions of work. Increasing division of labour, greater mechanization, the growth of giant industrial and financial enterprises - these are the agents of our economic power and also of individual powerlessness.

In a recent survey of industrial worker's attitudes Robert Dubin shows that for most of them work is not a central life interest. Dubin says, "Not only is the workplace relatively unimportant as a place of preferred primary human relationship, but it cannot even evoke significant sentiments and emotions in its occupants". Most

workers are not happy in their jobs, that they feel trapped and degraded by their working conditions, that they have powerful desire to escape from the factory, their works and that what drives them on is the incessant demands of our consumption economy. In view of the same far from escaping, growing numbers of industrial workers and their families are forced to take on additional jobs in order to keep up with the rising cost of living.

Consequently there has been a serious fall in morale. It is a measure of the boring conditions of work. A cruel work situation is bound to evoke anger or rage, however, repressed. But even under "Ideal" conditions of bureaucratic order - where there are neither great creative incentives nor disruptive tensions - the result is an isolated, remote world of conformists, that is what Mills calls the "cheerful robots".

The alienating influences of industrialism extend far beyond the individual worker; they alienate his family and his community with equal intensity and force. As the old crafts declined, and labour became increasingly divided and specialized, the economic and social base of the large family was destroyed. Lost were customs and skills that had been passed on from one generation to another. Gone were the close bonds between young and old, and especially the respect that youth had previously given to age. Into the new

industrial cities poured millions who had been cut off from their traditional family roots.

With changes in family function, especially the decline of large kinship group as an operating unit, have come significant changes in structure. Work is now increasingly separated from family life and Parents disappear during the day, leaving children to grow up chiefly with servants or in boardings. They have no time to spend with their children. Most affected by the breakdown of the extended family, however are the aged. Overwhelming majority of citizens oppose the idea of having older persons live with their children. As these trends continue - the prolongation of life, early retirement, breakdown of the extended family - the aged become outcasts in a society like ours that places such emphasis on youth and energies. The elderly citizens are being increasingly shifted to separate housing colonies where they nurse their painful lives by recourse to nostalgic remembrances of their youth. In their twilight world there is only fleeting contact with the community. The rise of 'nuclear family' (the small core unit of parents and kids) is directly and intimately linked to these distinguishing or characterizing features of our industrial age, inspired and brought about by ever-increasing technological sophistication.

In the beginning we said that men today are estranged from others as well as from themselves. But "others" means not only the social communities in which they live; it also refers to the natural and supernatural worlds beyond. When we speak of man's alienation from nature, we do not mean nature in metaphysical sense - although fairly serious metaphysical problems are involved; all we mean is that men and women today are not as close to land, air, water wind and mountains as their ancestors were. That is how I express this feeling :

The night kept descending
 I stared at the falling stars,
 the silver streams
 flowed down the mountains
 fading in darkness,
 the constellation of stars
 adorned the world and dissolved,
 and the moon bowed down
 to kiss the cold forehead
 the horizon darkened even deeper,
 I kept lying for long
 without a breath, a notion,
 and memory kept enveloping my being
 with the dead leaves of fallen flowers.²¹

Isolation from nature is not just a matter of living in cities even more importantly it involves a momentous change in man's outlook on the world. Men do not simply coexist with nature, they search for meaning in

it. For this they depend on myth and religion. All religious beliefs known to man help create and sustain bonds between him and the external world of other men and of nature. But if faith weakens or is destroyed in the onslaught of science and secularisation, man is truly alone. As Joseph Cambell writes, "The problem of mankind today is.....the opposite to that of men in the comparatively stable period of those great co-ordinating mythologies which now are known as lies. Then all meaning was in the group, in the great anonymous forms, none in the self-expressive individual; today no meaning is in the group - none in the world : all is in the individual. But..... one does not know toward that one moves. One does not know by what one is propelled.... Not the animal world, not the plant world, but man himself is now the crucial mystery. Man is that alien presence with whom the forces of egoism must come to terms, through whom the ego is to be crucified and resurrected and in whose image society is to be reformed."

²²

So we have a view of man divorced from nature, bereft of his religion, isolated in his community and chained to monotonous work. It is appropriate at this point to consider our Mass Society, its culture, and its politics. The mass society resulted from the rapid

increase in the size of the electorate. Extension of suffrage to the working class who had fought for it, led in turn to the rise of mass political parties and also to new techniques of communication : mass circulation newspapers, films, radio and television etc.

The results of these developments are well known. In politics, the number of people involved tend to engulf the individual, whether he dissents from majority opinion and taste, or whether he merely conforms helplessly with the overwhelming majority.

What is alienating in mass society is not merely the corruption of art, or the power of the multitudes - a power often exaggerated but more importantly, the atomization of individuals who make up the mass. Mass society weakens or destroys traditional human groupings, thus leaving the individual at the mercy of impersonal "communication", such as newspaper, radio and internet. In addition this process of communication itself, presumably a two-way system, tends to become a one-way street, with individuals more on the receiving or taking end than on the giving end. How does one talk back to a TV screen ? As a result, the formation of opinion is facilitated for those who control the channels of communication. Whether they be propagandists or the advertising industry in our own

society; the stage is set for manipulation of tastes and opinions as obstacles to mass persuasion are removed. A polluted mass is alienated to the extent that it is powerless to withstand these pressures. So it is not masses but a powerful elite which monopolizes the means of communications, thereby weakening primary human relations and creating obedient multitudes.²³

Another major form of alienation reflected at one extreme is the revolts of artists and intellectuals against what they consider the uncongenial and materialistic standards of bourgeois society. Personifying this revolt in their art, as well as in their lives, are writers like Baudelaire - an "internal emigrant" who longed to escape "any where out of this world"; Rimbaud who did escape and whose self-imposed exile became a model for many artistic rebels following him; Dostoyevsky - who regarded the freedom of the atheistic individual, his loneliness and isolation as the greatest of evils and in whose works the twin themes of the atomization of society and self-alienation receive their supreme expression. We are dealing with more than mere disenchantment. Thus says Charles Peguy : "The modern world debases. It debases the state; it debases man. It debases love; it debases woman. It debases the race; it debases the child. It debases the nation; it debases the family. It even.... has succeeded in

debasing what is perhaps most difficult in the world to debase - because that is something which has in itself, as in its texture, a particular kind of dignity, like a singular incapacity for degradation - it debases death.²⁴

Man's alienation has been described with methodic and terrifying precision by Kafka, who wrote of himself; "I am separated from all things by a hallow space, and I do not even reach to its boundaries".²⁵ The main characters in his novels, The Trail and The Castle are completely depersonalized and reduced to mere masks. This loss of identity leads to a state of radical anonymity, which the author symbolizes by not using a name but merely a letter of the alphabet to refer to them.

American novelists also have described man's fate in terms of alienation and homelessness. Thomas Wolfe, who devotes much of his work to recording the painful experience of the uprooted man, the nostalgic exile and wanderer, sums it up in the symbolic words of Engene Gant, the central figure of "The Return of the Prodigal"; "What did you come home for ?.... you know now that you can't go home again".²⁶

Arthur Miller's Death of a Salesman portrays lives of many individuals. It shows Willy Loman - the "other - directed man" personified - striving all his life

to be popular and "liked" but remaining absolutely lonesome and irrelevant, forever dreaming that "personality always wins the day" but in reality destined, as his wife fears, "to fall into his grave like an old dog" motto is : start big and you will end big. He advises his son : "Get right down the field under the ball, and when you hit, hit low and hit hard". He does not realize that he himself is kicked around and that his whole existence is summed up in the world with which one of the women in the play describes her life "a foot ball".²⁷

The alienation is not an unknown phenomenon to the Asian psyche also, especially to famous Urdu poet Ghalib who's first poetic collection published during the Indian mutiny bears a famous Persian couplet :

BEAWARED CAR EINJA BUWAD SUKHAN DANE
GHAREEBE SHAHR SUKHAN HAE GUFTANI DARAD

بیاد دید گرایں جا بود سخن دانی
غریبِ شهر سخن ہائے گفتنی دارد

There is a person who is in search of a close friend to whom he can disclose all the insights of his heart. The same echo we can find in the famous disciple of Ghalib, Altaf Hussain who has said in his couplet that he is in search of a person who can understand his language and emotion :

KOYEE MEHRAM NAHIN MILTA JAHAN MEN
 MUJHE KEHNA HAI KUCH APNI ZUBAN MEN

کوئی محرم نہیں ملتا جہاں میں
 مجھے کہنا ہے کچھ اپنی زباں میں

Even Iqbal has explored the helplessness of human self:

TERAY AZAD BANDON KI NA YE DUNIYA NA WO DUNIYA
 YAHAN MARNAY KI PABANDI WAHAN JEENAY KI PABANDI

تیرے آزاد بندوں کی نہ یہ دُنیا نہ وہ دُنیا
 یہاں مرنے کی پابندی وہاں جینے کی پابندی

Alienation expressed by Artists is the most sensational. The writers whom we quoted, reflect a growing contemporary concern about man's Isolation and Alienation but this does not mean that they visualize this estrangement in the same way as the existentialists do. Unlike those followers of Heidegger and Sartre who look man's alienation and homelessness as his eternal fate, many of those who turn to the writers we have mentioned attribute the alienation to historical events.

Such an explanation, no doubt right in emphasizing the historical aspects of man's alienation, attributes the rise of alienation to a few isolated and almost fortuitous occurrences which have broken in upon the lives of the present generation - so to speak - from the outside. However, such a premise is of

dubious merit because it tends unduly to limit the scope of inquiry. It leads us to ignore that alienation is manifest in all realms of modern life, that its existence is not just the result of certain accidents of recent history but exemplifies one of the basic trends of our age. To conclude I would like to mention one of my poems :

My bed is a wilderness
of sleeplessness,
I break into peices
licking dust,
I wear a white layer
of Plaster of Paris
every night
on my being,
and when the morning arrives.....
I find a line drawn
on my bed,
and the continuity of that line
remains intact
even when divided
into a thousand bits.²⁸

CHAPTER III

THE CONCEPT OF ALIENATION

The feeling of alienation in the form of unfulfilment of a sense or lack is ever present in the being of man. It is thus not a feeling peculiar to our age; only it has now assumed an acute form. Alienation is native to our very nature. Yet it cannot be denied that the factors responsible for alienation or creating an alienating atmosphere are found to be more powerful in our age or in some social, cultural economic conditions rather than in others. In our day to day life we feel more and more concerned about the increasing magnitude of this problem. The growing prevalence of alienation is due to various factors. The fast life style, the complex and competitive socio-economic structure, the political atmosphere of confrontation and disobedience, automatization and increasing dehumanization of the uses of science and technology - each of these factors, besides many others, has contributed to a growing sense of alienation in the world today. Alienation pertains not only to our feelings but to the whole of our being, to its very aspect. Alienation has been a persistent problem for man since the beginning of the civilization. But it has assumed importance in philosophy and literature in the society with the development of Industry and technology on a mass scale. Earlier Philosophers, particularly greeks, were more concerned with the cosmos and Ideas. Man was also treated as the manifestation of Rationality

(Aristotle). Except Socrates no other Western thinker seems to be interested in the Individual man of flesh and bones, his sufferings, his choice of destiny, his growth and his death. Of course greek plays and poetry did not ignore man as an aspiring and suffering individual like Prometheus. Philosophy on the whole remained interested in generalizations and universal ideas and principles. Mystics though their approach apparently God-centric, dealt with individual man, for it was he whose spiritual journey was their main concern. In the East Buddhism is the only philosophy that is concerned with human suffering. Buddha was mainly interested in finding out a way out from suffering. Likewise in Sufi tradition we find interest in individual man.

The English concept 'alienation' goes back to the Latin concepts 'alienation' (alienare) and 'abalienatio' (abalienare). These concepts employed by Seneca and especially Cicero, essentially designated the sale of a commodity; the cessation transfer, or sale of rights and property. The main application of the concepts 'alienatio' and 'abalienatio' was therefore in the area of Roman civil and agrarian law (Mitteis, 1908, p 145; Sturm, 1957). Furthermore, 'alienation' in the sense of 'alienatio mentis' has a medical - psychiatric connotation which has been retained in the vocabulary of the discipline.¹

The term 'alienation' historically had three basic senses, all of which derive from the root concept of the 'alien' as the different, the foreign. In one sense it refers to the kind of economic transfer. In another it refers to a condition of separation or estrangement from someone or something other than oneself, with which one once was or ideally should be united. And in a third, it refers to a state of mental derangement or disorder.

When alienation in the sense of transfer occurs, one gives up and no longer has ownership of and control over something which once belonged to one. When alienation in the sense of separation occurs one is unable to identify with someone or something with which one might under other circumstances be at one. And when alienation in the sense of derangement obtains, one is not oneself and he might be said to be a stranger to oneself.

In our common day to day life the term 'alienation' has been variously used and possesses varied meanings in religion, in sociology, in science, in psychology or in philosophy. But all of these different usages of such an interdisciplinary concept seem to have a common core which is derived from its etymology. The word in general refers to the process of separation or estrangement of somebody or something from something else (to which it ought to be

essentially connected).

Melvin Seeman, in his article 'on the Meaning of Alienation', offers an elaborate conceptual analysis of its diverse meanings. Seeman enumerates the following five meanings of the term 'alienation' :

- (a) **Powerlessness:** The expectancy or probability held by the individual that his own behaviour cannot determine the occurrence of the outcomes or reinforcements he seeks.
- (b) **Meaninglessness:** A low expectancy that satisfactory predictions about the future outcomes of behaviours can be made.
- (c) **Normlessness:** A high expectancy that socially unapproved behaviours are required to achieve given goals.
- (d) **Isolation:** Assigning low reward value to goals or beliefs that are typically highly valued in the given society.
- (e) **Self-estrangement:** The degree of dependence of the given behaviour upon anticipated future rewards, i.e.; upon rewards that lie outside the activity itself.²

The concept of alienation was first philosophically elaborated by Hegel. He was the first Western philosopher

who discussed the problem of "estrangement" of God from his creation and in this context he also dealt with the problem of man's Alienation. As against Hegel's idealistic-rationalistic approach to this problem, Kierkegaard, his contemporary, approached to this issue from human view-point and thus laid down foundation of existentialist philosophy of man, which found exponents in the twentieth century as Kierkegaard's, Heidegger, Sartre, Marx and Camus. Earlier than modern existentialists Karl Marx, paid attention as to how man is alienated from nature, God, society and himself in capitalist industrial society. The 20th century "philosophy of man" in a highly mechanical culture dominated by technocracy and bureaucracy, found man reduced to the status of a negligible part of a gigantic machinery that resulted in a continuing process of dehumanization, a form and course of individual's Alienation at various levels.

Some writers have maintained that the Christian doctrine of original Sin and redemption can be regarded as a first version of Hegel's doctrine of alienation and dealienation. According to others, the concept of Alienation found its first expression in Western thought in the old Testament concept of idolatry. Still others have maintained that the source for Hegel's view of nature as a self alienated form of absolute mind can be found in Plato's view of natural world as imperfect picture of the sublime world of Ideas. Among

others, the positive meaning of alienation is also taken up by Plotinus (205-70). Furthermore, we find positive connotations with Augustine (325-430) and Meister Eckhart (1260-1327), who both in turn have had an influence on Hegel and Fichte.²

Plotinus dealt with the task of soul : not to fall prey to the body, rather to keep close to itself, so to speak, in a suspended state. At the same time, Plotinus reflected upon the necessity, that the soul (the 'light') needs the body in order to perceive anything at all. Without a body, the soul would remain completely in pneuma, in the spiritual realm, and therefore would not be able to go through the other, the body in order to return to the light.³

For Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) 'alienatio' is always a preparatory stage for the real, the experience of God. He too connects ecstasy with alienation. In 'The Summa Theologica' he essentially deals with alienation as 'alienation a sensibus'.⁴ 'Alienatio a sensibus' can mean, for example, that the 'Spirit' of the prophet is illuminated by the light. Meister Eckhart attempts to transcend the limitation in Thomas's concept of alienation - a limitation that asserts the validity of only the supernatural emotion devoid of any corporality. The meaning of alienation is widened. Only God is without 'anything alien'; everything that has come into being, that has been created, is alien by contrast. The soul in order

to redeem an unalienated status, has to liberate itself from the creature - like body and herewith from life, has to carry itself off' to 'despiritualize' only because the soul withdrawn itself from the life (usually viewed as rational) in which it has sunk before, does this abolition of alienation become possible. We can also say that alienation, for Meister Eckhart is the precondition of true life.⁵

Although we cannot call 'alienation' a new term, it has come into prominence recently. Hegel and Marx make extensive use of the concept. Marx traces the sources of alienation to the workers lack of spiritual development and thus it is a necessary phase to all progress. Existentialism tends to see estrangement as arising from a lack of self-acceptance of the failure to develop an independent self. Freedom almost necessitates alienation, because one who is free does not have to be anything. Thus, one is alienated from himself because the requisite decisions to crystalise the self have not yet been made. If freedom remains, it follows that alienation will be a constant human experience as long as choice lasts. Thus we find that sources of alienation are many. Furthermore, alienation is a by-product of an increasing sense of freedom and may have to be tolerated if the uncertainties of the freedom are valued.

As long as multiple accounts of the source and nature of alienation are given, it cannot be finally overcome. Thus the

basis of alienation lies in the existence of plurality of philosophies which never allow man to view himself under one pattern only. As long as intellectual freedom remains alienation and philosopher's feeling of estrangement will persist. Infact it is alienation that forms the basic philosophical attitude of questioning.

Kierkegaard finds in 'the Pathos of distance' the source of the poetic spirit that produces verbal creation. of course, he is the one in the modern age who has stressed the essential 'aloneness' of men in all crucial and decesive phases of choice. To be alienated may be to be creative, although most existentialists are disillusioned romanties. They recognise that such total aloneness and freedom is hard to bear and is also the source of selfdestruction, as often as it leads to creative effort. Those who simply accept prevailing values and themselves as they are do not experience alienation, but neigher do they learn the origin of philosophic attitude of criticism.

Hegel believed that philosophy could itself provide a feeling of triumph over alienation. Kierkegaard essentially denies this by reversing the role of the philosopher. The philosopher is one who by nature must be immersed in the ordinary world with its inevitable alienations. Hegel could escape by idealised thought; Kierkegaard could not. If all of us as souls are

divided, we all experience alienation to the extent that we do not discover a final unity. If as selves the world around stays alien to us in the sense of being 'other' to live the world among men is never to escape a feeling of alienation. Estrangement from ones fellowmen and from society often coincides with a period of great productivity.⁶

The predicament of contemporary man is best predicted not only in the absurd literatures of the Anglo-American and European languages but also in the languages of developing world. With the eradication of traditional values and facing the world without a God and where there can be no appeal to supernatural forces and where the traditional religious beliefs have lost their relevance and efficacy, man finds himself hanging between earth and heaven. His feet cannot reach the earth and his hands are unable to get hold of skies. In the absence of Religious beliefs and prospects of another world after this life, man has to squarely face the fact of his death and annihilation.

Since for the most of the contemporary men, there is no God. Man is the author of his destiny and he is the only source of his values. He is free to choose and as Dostovesky has said, "if there is no God everything is allowed". This implies that man is solely responsible for his condition in this life. Man creates his own society. Man creates his own

world. Consequently it is only man who is responsible for his actions. In this situation when man is deprived of the traditional supports of Religion and other sorts of supernatural systems, and when he is confronted with a hostile environment in a society where there is no social justice and above all when man has this realization that some day he has to die and that will be the end of his world. He not only feels despair and anguish but often times feels not only alienated from the society and the people around him but also from himself.

Today, people have acquired a certain amount of main types of existence, such as that of wage-earner; the salaried employee, the peasant, the handicrafts man, the entrepreneur, the civil servant. But the general fellowship of our human situation has been rendered even more dubious than before, in as much as, though the old ties of caste have been lowered, a new restriction of the individual to some prescribed status in the sociological machinery has become manifest. What is today common to us all, is not our humanity as a universal and all pervading spirit of fellowship, but the cosmopolitanism of catchwards in conjunction with the spread of world-wide means of communication. The general sociological situation is not the decisive factor in our destinies, being rather that which threatens us with annihilation. The decisive factor is the developing possibility of a selfhood. This selfhood does not yet exist.

We are not much aware of the pre-historical man although contemporary and Anthropological Research has been able to bring out massive Researches on the life conditions of ancient man who was mostly confined to his tribe culture and moores. He mostly substained by my—thical views and engagements. However subsequently powerful religious traditions emerged and man at different points of history and geography lived by articulate world views and value systems. The historical Religion such as Hinduism, Judiasm, Christianity, Islam etc. provided elaborate doctrinal frame works wherein ontological, cosmological and axiological questions pertaining to human existence were sought to be answered. For the last three thousand years man has been living within the parameters of these frame works. His existential questions, his sociopolitical ideas and his moral do's and donot's were responded by these world views. However with onset of modernization chiefly heralded by experimental science and technology, the grip of historical religion on human society has been loosened. Science, although presumby a value free enterprize and methodical integration of universe, as a matter of fact impinges upon our values, beliefs and cultural outlooks and consequently a new civilisation pattern emerges with its own normative structure and interests and priorities.

Therefore contemporary man is caught between his tradition, Religion, moorings and modern scientific imperatives.

The tradition, Religion and modern science simultaneously pulls modern mind and compel for his loyalties. Religion traditionally provided him a set of definitions and norms whereby man could atune himself to the vast space-Time continuum called universe. Science leads technological development but it simultaneously robs of his spiritual moorings. Thus modern man is on the horns of any self Analysis. This has lead to wide spread normlessness and consequently modern man is Alienated from himself, from universe and from God.

The construction of mental situation of the present will continue with growing awareness of the limits of the knowledge, on the one hand and of the risks of undue absoluteness, on the other, there will be a tendency to rest content with particular perspectives as representations of the situation. In their particularity they will be valid but they will have no absolute validity.

In order to trace out the causes of Alienation, the roots of powerlessness and meaninglessness are to be sought. To discover, when Alienation occurs is to discover what forces generate powerlessness.

The roots of powerlessness and meaninglessness lie in the relationships between Social systems and Individuals.

Relationships between Social systems and individuals are determined in two ways:

1. The degree Social systems are endowed with legitimacy and
2. the degree system integration is indeterminate. The first dimension is instrumental. It indicates the extent Social systems allow individuals to pursue goals of their own choice. The second dimension is expressive. It shows the extent Social systems permit expression of Individual identity. These two dimensions are explored by Jan Hajda and Robert Travis in the following way:

Legitimacy, illegitimate control and quasi-legitimacy.

Legitimacy is a quality of Social systems, stemming from those sets of embraced principles which embody the common good. These principles can be rationalized into law or articulated by a leader.

Legitimacy has two primary functions: to formalize authority by conferring the right to command and to lend the system enduring meaning. The right to issue commands may be granted to one person, a select few or almost everyone. As long as legitimized principles endure, authority exists unquestioned. This is important since authority alleviates fear among individuals. It frees rulers from fearing their own

subjects, while liberating subjects from fearing their own rulers.

Legitimacy, moreover, endows Social systems with meaning. This endowed meaning becomes an incontrovertible reality, which serves as a reference point and confirms for individuals that what they do is right.

Thus Legitimacy engenders acceptance of Social Systems. This is particularly true as successive generations enter these systems, taking legitimacy for granted. Consequently individual-system relations appear spontaneous and voluntary. Individuals come to regard system-goals as their own and believe they can realize their objectives within its framework.

But legitimacy represents only the mid-point on one continuum, the power extremes being illegitimacy and quasilegitimacy. For legitimacy can be undermined, changing into illegitimacy, by corruption, arbitrariness or exploitation. Legitimacy can also be turned into quasilegitimacy by ineptitude, forgetfulness, and resistance to over conflict. while illegitimacy embodies deliberate disregard of sanctions, quasi-legitimacy entails irresolute use of sanctions. Both represent crisis of legitimacy.

Example of illegitimate control abound: dictatorships, military cliques or despotisms; governments, political parties, business enterprises, labour unions, or associations all riven by corruption and scandal; economic systems or corporations that maximize profits by keeping wages low; legal or defacto systems of segregation that restrict opportunities for minorities; and androcentric institutions that regard women as unequals.


Those subjects to illegitimate control have one thing in common i.e. they perceive a profound discrepancy between the choices they would like to make and the choice social systems allow them. They realize they are being used, deceived, manipulated, oppressed or persecuted; that they are mere objects of other people's actions. The result is instrumental powerlessness, the recognition of a relative inability to influence or control one's social destiny, accompanied by perception that this powerlessness is wrong and unjust.

On the other hand, quasilegitimacy is a repeatedly renewed provisional state which seeks to forestall anarchy and chaos. It keeps social systems going despite their absurdity. It is based on defacto conditions created by fortuitous circumstances and the present lack of meaningful alternatives.

Quasi-legitimacy often arises when non-political experts gain control of political reins; when political parties

Quasi-legitimacy often arises when non-political experts gain control of political reins; when political parties offer roughly the same kind of programs and candidates; when bureaucracies ensnare their clients in red tape; when congregations become mainly community centres or social outlets; or when marriages are merely for convenience.

Rulers claim opportunities are limitless, while individuals realize the situational myths of such claims. Instrumental meaninglessness results, as individuals are forced to choose among a set of alternatives between which there are no real differences. When choices become empty, choice becomes meaningless. Following figure presents this argument graphically.



Near the mid-point individuals experience little or no alienation, since their choices are in harmony with those offered by legitimized social orders. Departure from the mid-point brings about a gradual, then rapid intensity of alienation. When individuals prefer and what social systems allow becomes

inverted. At the polar extremes, Alienation becomes unbearable. But halfway between the mid-point and the poles alienation moderates, representing the most likely occurrences. Such alienation embodies the melding of either illegitimacy or quasi-legitimacy with legitimacy itself. Thus, powerlessness arises among working-class youths who contend the class system blocks them from attaining those system goals they want to reach; among employees locked in dead-end jobs within organizations they still respect; or among people of a government they could not support, but whose constitution they still believed in.⁷

CHAPTER IV

EXISTENTIALIST CONCEPT OF ALIENATION

Existentialism has been a reaction in favour of individualism, Subjectivity introspection and feeling. It is a Philosophy not of things but of human situation. Existentialists' major thesis is the metaphysical pronouncement that "Existence is prior to essence", while in the established tradition "essence is prior to existence". What this means for existentialists is that human nature is determined by the course of life rather than life by human nature.

Alienation is a part of human nature. Whatever man does, individually or collectively, bears the imprint of alienation. For the existentialist, alienation is understood chiefly in inward terms. It is the existent's alienation from his own deepest being. He is not himself but simply a thing of no importance in the mass existence of the crowd. In Marx system alienation is called that condition of man where his own act becomes to him an alien power, standing over and against him, instead of being ruled by him. Initially Marx was deeply impressed by Feurbach's analysis of Religious alienation. However he immediately realized that the religious form of alienation was only one-sided and partial. It is only one among many other aspects of human alienation. Marx discovered that the basic form of alienation was economic, rooted in the capitalist mode of production. When human labour becomes and is treated as, a marketable commodity, man becomes

dehumanized. A separation grows between man-as-man and man-as-labour.

Marx led to believe that God is a creation of man's speculative mind. Thus the God-man relationship is completely reversed. This is a transition from spiritual theology to natural theology. Marx observes :

Man makes religion; religion does not make man. Religion is indeed man's self-consciousness and self-awareness so long as he has not found himself or lost himself again. But man is not an abstract being, squatting outside the world. Man is the human world, the state, the society. The state, the society produce religion which is the consciousness of an inverted world because it is an inverted world.¹

Marx does not consider religion to be the only seat of alienation. It is present also in Society and State. Alienation pervades all spheres of human life. It is not peculiar to the realms of religion and politics only. Marx traces its roots in the capitalist economic system of the time. The Social system and political structure reflect alienation. Hegel's tendency to understand alienation as the spirit's estrangement from itself had a subjectivist overtone, alienation was depicted as an affair confined within the realm of mind. In contrast Marx discovered that alienation of mind was due to the productive relations into which human beings as classes

were thrown. Labour is the key concept in Marxian interpretation of alienation. It is the essence of human nature. It is his 'life-activity'. Marx uses a term 'praxis'-labour related to an objective situation and directed to the realization of particular goal. It is through praxis that man creates objects, changes and gives objects, transforms the world around him and in process transforms himself. In the capitalist Society the worker suffers different types of Alienation.

The worker is related to the product of his labour as to an alien object. The object he produces does not belong to him, dominates him, and only serves in the long run to increase his poverty. Alienation appears not only in the result but also in the process of production and productive activity itself. The worker is not at home in his work which he views only as a means of satisfying other needs. It is an activity directed against himself, that is independent of him and does not belong to him. Thirdly alienated labour succeeds in alienating man from species. Species life, productive life, life producing life, turns into a mere means of sustaining the worker's individual existence and man is alienated from man, who thus loses his inorganic body.²

Hegel beleived that every form of objectification is alienation. Marx deviated from this Hegelian view. He felt that alienation was limited only to some specific forms of objectification where the object gets lost to the individual and takes an alien implication. It is this distinction between

alienation and objectification that lead Marx to capitalist mode of production. That in a capitalist society the labourer becomes alienated is due to the fact that 'his' praxis turns out to be impersonal, i.e. not really his.³ The labourer finds it impossible for him to identify himself with the product of his labour. He cannot own it, it belongs to the controlling class. In the capitalist market the labourer is obliged to put his labour on sale as if it were a commodity. Thus it is not only his product which is alien to him, his own labour is also alien to him because it is marketed, bought and owned by capitalist.

The Alienation of labour is that the work he performs is not personal to him, is not part of his nature, therefore he does not fulfil himself in work but actually denies himself. He feels miserable rather than content. Only while not working can the worker be himself while at work he experiences himself as stranger. His labour is not voluntary but forced labour. It satisfies no spontaneous creative urge, but is only a means for the satisfaction of wants which have nothing to do with work. Its alien character is revealed by the fact that when no physical or other compulsion exists, work is avoided. The alienated character of worker is shown by the fact that at work he belongs not to himself but to another. Just as religion the spontaneous activity of human imagination, of the human brain and heart, is seen as the alien activity of gods or devils, so the workers labour is no more his own spontaneous activity, but is something impersonal, inhuman and belonging to another.⁴ Through his work the labourer loses his

identity.

As a result worker feels freely active only in his animal functions - eating drinking procreating while in his human and social functions he is reduced to an animal. Certainly eating, drinking and procreating are also human functions but abstractly considered, apart from all other human activities and regarded as ultimate ends in themselves, they are merely animal functions.

In Marxian analysis there is no inter-individual relationship in the capitalist society. There is lack of human intimacy. There is no subjectivity. The worth of man is determined not by his personal qualities. Marx highlights that the social network of human relations generated by the capitalist economy is bound to be marked by alienation. Alienation may be a property of human action. An action is called alienation by Marx if by and through it a person, or a group or an institution, or a society becomes or remains separated (1) from the products/results of its own activity; and/or (2) from the activity itself; and/or (3) from the nature in which it lives; and/or (4) from other human beings.⁵

When a man is aware of his capacity to create some new possibilities and yet feels simultaneously excluded from actually creating them, he feels alienated from himself. Man's identity is his possibilities. When his incapacity affects that identity, alienation is the consequence. Self-alienation is the

very essence of alienation. Self alienation is used in two senses in Marx. It may mean the misappropriation of labour and its product. When man's personal and spiritual powers are controlled by others, his very self becomes alienated. His service is put to other's use. The term 'Self-alienation' is used by Marx also to determine man's departure from his truly essential nature. Distinct individuality, lively society and cultivated sensibility are among the defining characteristics of a truly human being. But these characteristics are seriously affected by the increasing impersonal capitalist system of production. Free market economy gradually dehumanizes man and reduces him to the position of a machine. Marx was deeply moved by this inhuman process and by the misery and suffering of the exploited labourer.

The notion of alienation has been depicted in many ways in HEGEL's writings. It is a basic idea of Hegel's philosophy that whatever is, is in the last analysis, Absolute Idea (Absolute Mind, Absolute Spirit, or in popular language, God) and that Absolute Idea is neither a set of fixed things nor a sum of static properties but a dynamic self, engaged in a circular process of alienation and dealienation. Nature is only a self-alienated form of Absolute Mind, and man is the Absolute in the process of dealienation. The whole of human history is the constant growth of man's knowledge of the Absolute and, at the same time, the development of Self-knowledge of the Absolute who through finite mind becomes Self-aware and "returns" to himself from his self-alienation in nature.⁶

However finite mind (man) also becomes alienated. It is essential characteristic of man to produce things, to objectify itself in physical things, to express itself in objects, to objectify itself physically, Socially and culturally and every objectification is an instance of alienation. The produced objects become alien to the producer.

Hegel's formulation of his basic issue is closely connected with his ontology and methodology. The Hegelian Absolute spirit is undoubtedly the central notion of his metaphysics. But this reality is essentially dynamic and expresses itself through a dialectic process. The process is continuously marked by alienation and dealienation. Its primary rhythms are Self-posting, Self-negating and Self-uniting. The spirit's Self-consciousness is realized dialectically. To start with, it is immediate but its inner dynamics introduces elements of differentiation in it. This necessitates the objectification of the Spirit's Self-consciousness. In its moment of Self-objectification the Spirit is alienated from its immediate character. Creative activity is bound to prove alienative in a sense. The Self-estrangement of the Spirit is not the only form of alienation Hegel speaks of. Another form of it is in the seeming bifurcation of the Spirit in two different realms, human and natural. Man is undoubtedly a clear expression of consciousness. And the Spirit's consciousness is present in nature as well. Both nature and man may be interpreted in two different ways, alienated from their common sustaining ground, Geist (Spirit),

and also alienated from each other. If man is considered essential in his finitude, he seems to be alienated from, if not antithetical to, nature. But, viewed from another standpoint, a more comprehensive one, he is a part of nature, the latter's Self-consciousness.⁷ The materialist or the physicalist might think that nature has nothing to do with consciousness; but it is not consciousness of its consciousness. Nature and man have affinity, if not unity, between them. But Hegel concedes that at the surface level man's Self-posting nature entails denial or negation of his life makes him conscious of how much he owes and belongs to nature. This consciousness negates his essentially alienative consciousness.

Hegel uses the notion of alienation in two quite different senses. This may be deduced from the two different expressions he uses in this context.

(i) Enttausserung and (ii) Entfremdung. The former literally means detachment, implying turning outward in order to realize the true inner self; the latter's literal meaning is estrangement-surrender of what man actually is in order to become what he potentially is. Referring to these two usages of alienation Richard Schacht speaks of 'alienation 1' and 'alienation 2'. The former means separation or discordant relation such as might obtain between the individual and the Social substance, and the latter means 'a surrender or sacrifice of particularity and wilfulness, in connection with the overcoming of 'alienation1'

and the re-attainment of unity.⁸ From Hegelianism it becomes evident that the first stage of 'alienation 1' is infelicitous and unhappy. But the second stage of 'alienation 2' is highly commendable and fruitful. Thus having taken up the notion of alienation from Social philosophy Hegel transformed it into a metaphysical notion. He uses it to characterise the process of progressive and alternating Self-differentiation and Self-identification of the Spirit, the main theme of his metaphysics.

A classic analysis of the fundamental duality of human existence is provided by SOREN KIERKEGAARD. He relates it to the phenomenon of anxiety. What emerges in Kierkegaard's analysis is not yet alienation in the full sense but rather what makes alienation possible.

Kierkegaard describes the anxiety of existence in three ways: first, it is already inherent in the state of innocence. Already in dreaming innocence there is something like an instability, an uneasiness, a presentiment that disturbs the tranquility of bliss. "This is the profound secret of innocency that at the same time it is anxiety."⁹ Secondly, anxiety is also linked to freedom. Again it is a kind of instability prior to action. Kierkegaard describes anxiety as the dizziness or "veritgo" of Freedom. For freedom means possibility and to stand is like standing on the edge of a precipice. One is standing on the firm or given, but to leave the given and to cast oneself into possibility is to let life

become a fluid. This stirring of possibility in primordial freedom is experienced as anxiety, the awareness of complexity, differentiation and possible alienation within the very depth of one's being.¹⁰

Third, Kierkegaard associates anxiety also with the traditional philosophical doctrine that man is constituted of body and soul. This is taken to mean that in the very way he is constituted, man is subject to the tension of anxiety. The human task is to accomplish the synthesis of body and soul and this task is from the beginning laden with anxiety. Anxiety is a peculiarly human phenomenon, related to the peculiar duality of the human condition. An animal knows no anxiety for its life is purely sensuous. But man in his "middle state", conjoining sense and intellect, body and soul, the given and the possible, lives in the tension of anxiety.

Kierkegaard while writing review of a novel, "The present age" protests against the levelling.

"The levelling process", he writes is not the action of an individual but the work of reflection in the hands of an abstract power. It is therefore possible to calculate the law governing it in the same way that one calculates diagonal in a parallelogram of forces. The individual who levels down is himself engulfed in the process and so on, and while he seems

to know selfishly what he is doing one can only say of people "en masse" that they know not what they do; for just as collective enthusiasm produces a surplus which does not come from the individual, there is also a surplus in this case. A demon is called up over whom no individual has any power and though the very abstraction of leveling gives the individual a momentary, selfish kind of enjoyment he is at the same time signing the warrant for his own doom. Enthusiasm may end in disaster, but levelling is "eo ipso" the destruction of the individual. No age, and therefore not the present age, can bring the scepticism of that process to a stop, for as soon as it tries to stop it, the law of levelling process is again called into action.¹¹

It can therefore only be stopped by the individual attaining in his loneliness the courage and dauntlessness of a religious man answerable to God.¹²

Levelling destroys the singularity and qualitative difference of the self, and therefore the order of value and of status. A sort of external alienation arises; the individual disappears in the mass.

This implies a new interpretation of alienation. The disappearance of the self in the mass is external alienation. Kierkegaard would go a certain way with Hegel. He would agree

that alienation is a Self-estrangement of the mind, not however, of the abstract or universal but of the individual mind or of the Self. He would further admit that man's intellectual culture represents a realm of estrangement. That is man has lost his Self, has ceased to be a man, has suffered dehumanization. Having become "objective", he fails to be a subject. He has become an abstract phantom and has lost his concrete life. He has ceased to exist and is in fact, non-existent. He is no longer a Christian, though externally he may be a member of a Church.

Alienation to Kierkegaard is a process going on in one's own self, not an external but an internal relation, based on one's own attitude to oneself. That is perhaps why Kierkegaard becomes the Psychologist or rather the Psychopathologist of Self-estrangement. He heralds the age of anxiety by describing the state of Alienation as anxiety. Anxiety refers to something indefinite. It is uncanny apprehension of some impending evil, of something not present but to come, of something not within us, but of an alien power. Kierkegaard describes it as a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy, as a desire for what one dreads.... an alien power, which captivates.... with a sweet apprehension". He compares it to a dizziness "in which freedom succumbs".¹³

In his "The sickness unto Death" Kierkegaard goes one

step further in his analysis of Alienation. Here Anxiety is transformed into despair and despair is the sickness unto death. It implies an important stage in the spiritual history of modern man, where modern doubt and scepticism turns inward focuses on one's own self and therefore leads to despair. Despair, says Kierkegaard, is the misproportion in the relation of the self to self, or every disturbance in the process of becoming a self, a sort of Self-consumption, a specific illness of man as a spiritual being, arising from his attempt to separate himself from the power which created him, or from the fact that he neglects what is eternal in him and forgets his spiritual nature. Whoever has no God has no Self and who has no self is in the despair. Despair forces a man to realize that he confronts a void and that he is infact responsible for his own sick and sinful condition. In the state of despair he is brought to recognize that what he despairs of are not the contingent facts that he claims to be the objects of his despair; the individual despairs of himself and to despair of oneself is to see oneself confronting an emptiness that cannot be filled by aesthetic pleasure or ethical rule. Moreover, it is in order to become conscious that one has brought oneself to this point. In analyzing despair, we recognize guilt; so too with dread. Kierkegaard contrasts the fear that has a specific and identifiable object with the dread that is objectless. In the experience of dread I become conscious of my bad will as something for which I am responsible, and yet which I did not

originate. Original sin is seen as a doctrine deduced from the analysis of experience.¹⁴

The word sin introduces a religious dimension which is not conveyed in the notion of pure moral guilt. Sin brings along a religious model for the understanding of guilt. The notion of existential estrangement does in fact recapture an important element in the traditional idea of sin. In existentialist philosophy, alienation implies alienation from oneself, from the possibility of authentic existence. In religion, sin means separation from God. But the two kinds of separation are closely connected and each is linked also with a third - Separation from other human persons.

According to existentialists, human existence is prior to everything and for them first principle is man's making of himself as he is a project which possesses subjective life. SARTRE also takes his stand on the same doctrine that existence precedes essence, by which he means that man is not defined by a common quality of human nature but rather is what he wills to be. Since there is no God, a fundamental postulate of Sartre's ontology, there is no concept of man in the mind of God which constitutes man's essence. Man does not come into the world ready-made; he is simply what he makes of himself, and is never made but always in the making.¹⁵

Sartre has discussed in detail the fact of Alienation in his writings. According to him there are two modes of being - 'being-in-itself' and 'being-for-itself'. Being-in-itself is the Self-contained being of a thing, a stone is a stone it is what it is and no more or less. It means the being of a thing always coincides with itself only. On the contrary, 'being-for-itself' is co-extensive with the realm of consciousness, and the nature of consciousness is that it is perpetually beyond itself.¹⁶ Accordingly Sartre holds that man in his existence, is always beyond this world, sometimes towards the future and sometimes outside of this world, and even transcends his own being. Man never possesses his being as he possesses a thing. Thus he never comes to the position of a thing that coincides with an object. This is only possible when he is not alienated from himself.

According to Sartre the human reality has the radical duality of the 'in-itself' and 'for-itself' and is made up of this duality. Whereas the in-itself is defined as a being "which is what it is, man or the human reality is defined as a being, which is what it is not and is not what it is".¹⁷

Sartre points out that man is nihilizing nothingness, because if existence has no objective ground nor has any reference to any system of values, then, in this sense, conscious human existence is pure nothingness. In other words,

due to the fact that man constantly creates himself as well as the objective situation his empirical being is viewed as nothing. It can be inferred that to exist man must perpetually transcend himself or be alienated from himself. Paul Tillich holds.

The State of existence is the state of estrangement. Man is estranged from the ground of his being, from other beings and from himself.¹⁸

From above it follows that man must abandon all hopes of attaining a secure and harmonious integration with the surrounding objective world. Accordingly, in desiring, valuing and existing, man necessarily rejects this objective world in which he lives. Therefore all projects which are turned towards the acceptance of the world as it is constituted imply a diminution of man's being and a loss of self respect in so far as they tend to reduce the tension which constitutes the necessary condition of free human action. Sartre in his "Being and Nothingness", points out that "Freedom is a lack of being in relation to a given being".¹⁹ He is emphatic in asserting that the human reality is a detotalized totality (of in-itself and for-itself). Man is both in-itself and for-itself but the important thing is that the two dimensions of his being are radically different.

Nothing, absolutely nothing justifies me in adopting this or that particular scale of values. As a being by whom values exist, I am unjustifiable. My freedom is anguished at being the foundation of values, while itself without foundation.²⁰

According to Sartre, the price of human existence is alienation from self, from God, from nature or material world and from society. Man is condemned to freedom. Sartre explains death, finitude and guilt from the stand-point of alienation. It is said that estranged from the ultimate power of being, man is determined by his finitude. His destiny is given over to his natural fate. He came from nothing and he returns to nothing. He is under domination of death and is driven by the anxiety of having to die. This infact is the answer to the question about the relation between Sin and death.

For Sartre, the most important feature of human reality is the fact of Self-transcendence. All the anguish and tragedy of human existence can be traced to this source. And it is this feature of human reality alone which constitutes its finitude. But for Heidegger on the contrary, death is the greatest source of anguish and the prime symbol of human finitude. He does not deny Self-transcendence. Sartre points

out that the awareness of death has value insofar as it obliges man. Moreover, he says that the awareness of death helps man to achieve authenticity. Therefore it is in fact, nothing other than an impossible attempt to be for oneself the essence or the nature which one can only be for another. Sartre in his 'Being and Nothingness' remarks:

The very existence of death alienates us wholly in our own life..... To be dead is to be a prey for the living. This means, therefore that one who tries to grasp the meaning of his future death must discover himself as the future prey of others. We have here, therefore, a case of alienation.²¹

This is in short, the existential exposition of alienation as elaborated by Sartre. "Existentialism", he has written, "is nothing else than an attempt to draw all the consequences of a coherent atheistic position"²². The discovery that there is no God and that man is alone is the beginning of a genuine humanism that dignifies man as the free creator of all values and of whatever meaning there is in human existence.

Sartre takes man as freedom. Man is free because he cannot be otherwise. He cannot escape his freedom, which

becomes for him, therefore a dreadful responsibility. But not only does one determine himself in his free choice, he also determines all others, for every decision he makes legislates for all men. Man is involved inevitably in anguish because his decision is never grounded in an external authority upon which he can rest the responsibility for his action. He must bear it alone. And when Sartre says alone, he means absolutely alone, no structure a priori for values to rest upon. Man's forlornness in his all-aloneness is which he must face the issue of his own freedom. For Sartre, that God does not exist is a dreadful fact that makes an ultimate difference to the world and to the man.

HEIDEGGER has attempted to escape the designation of existentialist on the ground that his concern is with being in its unity and totality rather than with existence, but he quite clearly is a major factor in the whole existentialist movement. His beginning point was the analysis of Dasein, an attempt to answer the question 'what is man'. Dasein is, in Heidegger's usage, a term not entirely translatable that refers to the mode of human existence.

The word "Dasein" is ordinarily translated as "existence". It is used in normal popular discourse. But Heidegger breaks it into its components "Da" "there" and Sein "Being" and puts his own definition on it. In general he means

man's conscious, historical existence in the world which is always projected into a there beyond its here. The German word Dasein has often been carried over into translations; the English strikes me as preferable. The qualification "in every case mine" means that being there is allotted to me in order that myself should be being-there. Being-there is "in every case mine"; this means neither "posited through me" nor "apportioned to an individual ego". Being there is itself by virtue of its essential relation to being in general. That is the meaning of the sentence that occurs frequently in *Sein und Zeit*: Being-there implies awareness of being.²³

Dasein which is always My Dasein, and is indefinable and indescribable, must be radically distinguished from existent things, designated as "Vorhanden" or "at hand". The existent things always belong to a genus and have describable qualities. It is possible therefore to determine their essence. But with Dasein there is no essence. Dasein is being, or "being there". It expresses only existence. It is not given it is possibility. Man exists through his choices and his being therefore is entirely indeterminate. Animals and inanimate things "are there" because they are localizations in space and time but they do not exist. Only man exists because only man has conscious awareness of his existence. To exist, to have an authentic being is to reflect on oneself, to be concerned

about oneself. True being is Self-being, involving not only consciousness but responsibility and free decision as well.

However the individual is not in total isolation. Human existence is a being-in-the world; the self is in relation to the not-self, a not-self of other persons and things. Very structure of individual is constituted by this relation with others and with the world. There is no escape from some involvement in social relations. To effect such an escape, to achieve anonymity, would destroy authentic existence by destroying all possibilities, all freedom and all choice. This would reduce the self to a thing.²⁴

Heidegger goes on to say that the "essence" of Dasein lies in its existence and he explains this to mean that Dasein's 'essence' is constituted not by properties but by possible ways of being. He offers this interpretation of the sentence : Man has an essence such that he is the "there", that is to say, the clearing of being. This 'being' of the there, and only this, has the basic characteristic of existence, that is to say, the ecstasies standing-in in the truth of being.²⁵ Heidegger tries to avoid a purely subjectivist or 'man is the measure of all things' reading of his assertion that the "essence" of Dasein lies in its existence. It was just this subjectivist interpretation that Sartre placed upon Heidegger's sentence, which in his philosophy, takes the form : 'Existence precedes essence'.²⁶

Heidegger represents a specific form of Alienation, i.e. the despair of an individual who desperately wants to be himself.

The individual is aroused from inauthentic existence and achieves an awareness of his authentic existence in anguish and dread. The experience of dread like the "Sickness unto death" of Kierkegaard brings one to the profoundest level of human emotion. Unlike fear, which is always of some specific and threatening thing and therefore has a definiteness about it, dread is an indefinite "feeling about", but not about any particular thing. It is not anything in the world, but the fact of being-in-the world that produces dread.²⁷

By dread we are held in suspense and it is in this suspense that Dasein is apprehended, for dread demands a choice between inauthentic impersonal existence and the genuine existence of Self-determination, it demands of a man that he takes upon himself his own destiny. Here we are revealed as partial, relative, and finite - cast out upon a world in which all is worthless, homeless, hopeless, and forlorn beings that have no reason for being whose existence is a "being for death". Heidegger believes that man is the being that knows he is going to die. He dies not only at the end of life but every day of it. Death is certain yet infinite. Life is cast between nothing and nothing. Death is its boundary and is its supreme

possibility. To freely accept death, to live in it is presence and to acknowledge that for it there is no substitute and into it one must go alone, is to escape from all illusions and to achieve genuine dignity and authentic existence.

For Heidegger "existence" is potential being, a possibility of being or not being oneself. It anticipates the future, it projects itself into the world.²⁸ As "the possibility of being oneself" it is authentic existence, as "the possibility of not being oneself" unauthentic existence. This is an interesting description of Self-estrangement. In unauthentic existence the Self loses itself in the "It" (Man), it behaves as a member of a crowd, like everybody or nobody, like the average man, it falls a prey to the temptations of this world and forgets its own mission. It talks superficially out of curiosity in an ambiguous manner. It handles what is "at hand". Heidegger claims that "being at hand" is ontologically more fundamental than "being there" and that the world is primarily the sphere of our activities.

Heidegger's analysis of 'falling' (Verfallen) is closely related to anxiety. He relates anxiety to falling just as Kierkegaard had related it to the Sin. In Heidegger's view what happens in falling is that the existent flees from himself. He may lose himself in the busyness of his concerns with the world of things. Yet this very fleeing from itself suggests that

the Dasein has in some way been already confronted with itself.

The flight connected with falling is quite different from a flight arising from fear. Fear is always fear of some definite being with the world but what we are concerned with is the flight from oneself.

Existentialism of JASPERS appears in its most complete form. In his concern with the full nature of being the philosopher must return from the object world of things to his own situation, to himself, not as an object to be known with other objects, but as existing being, involved in concrete predicaments, in particular and peculiar circumstances. Here he does not find universality, objectivity or knowledge. These are available only to the abstractive intellect in its contemplation of the empirical world.²⁹

The saying "Know thyself" is misleading. Man cannot know himself; he is his own greatest mystery. We have a knowledge of what we are not, but not of what we are. In his freedom man has an awareness of his humanity. He has no other essence than free choice. It is the task of the existential method to bring about the consciousness of freedom and of the absolute responsibility which it entails. It must bring the individual to a realization also of the existence of others by effecting communication with them. In the subjective search of

his private consciousness, man finds crises, freedom and decision, these are existence. The existent Self is not a being who is free and makes decisions. The self is the very freedom and the decisions which are made. It is Self-determining, determined by its own choice, which is both original and absolute.

Man is alienated from his world. He comes from a dim past and goes into an indefinite future. Life is a flux in which he seeks anchor. Existence is rich in mysterious paradoxes and antinomies, such as those of freedom coexisting with dependence, communication with solitude, good with evil, truth with falsehood, happiness with grief, life with death, and progress with destruction.³⁰

Philosophy of existence, says Jaspers, is a way of thinking which uses and transcends all material knowledge, in order that man may again become himself. The articulation of this system is based on three acts of transcending namely first a transcending to the universal in the realm of objects, eg. to the idea of the unity of science; secondly a transcendence of the empirical data given in our knowledge, to an elucidation of our authentic being; and lastly the attempt to reach the Absolute in metaphysics. Authentic Existenz is disclosed through reason (Vernunft) while intellect (Verstand) concerns itself with the pragmatic management of existence. Verstand is satisfied with

practical results while vernunft engages in endless searching. Man is both vernunft and Existenz.

A defining characteristic of man is his finitude, which he experiences as the limits to his existence. Jasper's analysis of these boundry situations is the existential formulation of the problem of evil. Authentic existence will push back these limits as far as possible and then accept them. Death is one of the most dramatic of these barriers. It is the source of anxiety but it also elevates the spirit. consciousness of the inevitable presence of death gives man courage and integrity. Guilt is another important boundary situation. Man not only feels guilty but because of his total freedom, is guilty. He always could have chosen otherwise. Ultimate guilt cannot be removed, it must be accepted and can thereby become constructive. Our guilt demonstrates the power that our freedom has over our destiny. The boundary of "situationality" is the fact that we are partially thrust and partially choose ourselves into a particular human condition. We can be inauthentic and fall into these situation or be authentic and make them happen. Other important boundaries are chance, suffering and conflict.³¹

Freedom is central to man. It leads to the overriding importance of choice, which becomes the problem of moral responsibility. But man's freedom, which is destroyed by every attempt to achieve scientific knowledge of himself as a whole, is

not separable from his consciousness of his finite nature. His finiteness is the finiteness of all living things, a dependence upon natural environment and natural process, the finiteness of whatever must die. It is the finiteness of dependence upon perceptual experience in human knowledge.³²

When man becomes aware of his finiteness he transcends it by a consciousness of infiniteness, for his potentialities have no limit. He realizes that he has not created himself and positively seeks the one being, the absolute, which is the goal of metaphysics. In the face of insecurity, suffering, despair, conflict, violence, guilt and death which are the lot of existing being, man yet goes forward with his eyes open and undeceived but with a faith that enables him to transcend the world and his situation in it, to achieve being-in-itself. Such transcendence is the total perspective that is gained not by objective knowledge but by genuine participation in life. For Jaspers the achievement of transcendence does not involve God. Awareness of transcendence originates in the consciousness of our finitude. Through our boundaries we recognize the infinite possibilities within us. The world itself points to a region beyond.

Existential Philosophy is Self-disclosure through communication. Even being itself, although it can be represented only in images as symbols, is made transparent solely through

authentic communication. Existential communication is neither friendship nor psychotherapy, it is not fusion, esteem or unanimity; it is strictly speaking as with Existenz itself, ineffable.³³

But finally human existence is a failure. There is no escape from man's limits especially the limit of death, yet man is condemned to endless striving. In this dreadful paradox between finite existence and striving for infinity man finds the ultimate symbol of his salvation, which is transcendence.

Man can search for transcendence by various means. He can explore the world as science does or he can search for it by examining the relation between himself and the world as we find it in epistemology, ethics and Psychology.

Jaspers expresses the antecedents of existentialism in the following sentences: 'what is new about this age..... is that man becomes conscious of being as a whole, of himself and his limitations. He experiences the terror of the world and his own powerlessness. He asks radical questions. Face to face with the void, he strives for liberation and redemption. By consciously recognizing his limits, he sets himself the highest goals. He experiences absoluteness in the depths of selfhood and in the lucidity of transcendence.'³⁴

Jasper described Alienation as "Provision for the masses in planned production with the help of technical devices".³⁵

He is concerned about the person who is in danger of becoming a cog and who loses his substance, self and his spiritual centre. Jaspers wants to show the way from the unauthentic existence of mass-man to the authentic existence of the self.

According to CAMUS, we live in a world the character of which is basically absurd so that we can only rebel against it. Camus contributed in a significant way to existentialist philosophy. The 20th century with two great world wars witnessed the barbarity and inhuman nature of human beings which was the result of dehumanization under gigantic development of industry and technology. Dehumanization is synonymous with man's alienation from himself. Camus is partially concerned with this issue. What Camus wishes to affirm against the dehumanization is a renewed sense of the human, which proves his message to be very much in the main stream of existentialist thought.

So as an existentialist Camus is also concerned with the problem of Alienation. The only difference between him and other existentialists is that Camus considers life as Absurd and therefore, in his view man is lost in absurdity. Whatever can give meaning to an individual life is to overcome life's absurdity. In his first novel The outsider (L' Etranger) he confines himself to Absurdity of life. Not only this, he emphasizes the meaninglessness of life as well as death in his other writings with great existential pathos and artistic dexterity. Some other existentialists also hold the view that life is meaningless. For instance Sartre argues that man's existence is grounded in nothingness. It means that he is free to give meaning to his life and environment in whatever way

he decides. Sartre holds that though the universe is meaningless, yet human existence is not. He says that meaning enters into the world with Being-for-itself. i.e. Human existence. Camus in his earlier phase does not agree with this view. His philosophy begins with absurdity of life and ends with absurdity of death. Sartre and other existentialists hold that death completes the meaning of life. This is the point of departure in Camu's concept of absurdity. This indicates his concept of alienation. Heidegger considers man lost in the society and deprived of his freedom as absurd entity. Exercising one's freedom and overcoming the world is the way to make life meaningful. Jaspers is of the view that the entire contemporary world predetermined and dominated by technocracy and bureaucracy reduces individual human existence to meaningless being. In order to make it meaningful man has to transcend this world and also his own existence. In Camu's The outsider there is no suggestion how absurdity can be overcome and life be made meaningful. But in his other writings we find an existential struggle to overcome absurdity of life. In his philosophical works, like Reble and Myth of Sisyphus, this attempt is obvious.

Camu's concept of absurdity of life leads him to his concept of outsider. Actually his outsider is an individual who is alienated from his society and his ownself. The outsider is perhaps the most notable modern attempt to describe a man unrelated to anything or anyone at all, a man for whom

everything is meaningless, a man who murders and feels nothing, a man who ends his tale of "nothingness" and absurdity by saying "for all to be accomplished, for me to feel less lonely, all that remained to hope was that on the day of my execution there should be a huge crowd of spectators and that they should greet me with howls of execration".³⁶ His indifference at the news of his mother's death and at her funeral also indicate his attitude towards life and death both of which seem to be absurd to him. Camus from the beginning regarded certain responses to absurdity as morally unacceptable. In his letters to German Friend (1943-44) he interpreted Nazism as one reaction to the very nihilistic vision of the world that he himself had come to accept.³⁷ He then went to condemn it in the severest terms for its denial of human fraternity. Even at this stage in the development of his thought Camus insisted that an authentic revolt against the human condition had to be a revolt in the name of the solidarity of man with man.

Death is seductive: 'I understand that men sometimes wish to die because, when life is revealed in all its transparency, nothing is important any longer.'³⁸ Transparency means the way in which the concrete world dissolves into near-emptiness. This tempts man and fills him with a death-wish which may take the form of suicide. Such a death-wish haunted Camus, but it disgusted as well as tempted him. When he describes his stay in Prague he depicts the disintegration of human character. Habit protects man, as do friends and

most interestingly words. But travel breaks down such things and compels man to face his emptiness. He is not a journalist or an office-worker or whatever he thought he was. The various traits of his character such as bravery, generosity or kindness crumble and leave him without any personality. This frightens him and he may plunge into violence or madness in order to escape from the anguish which is the mark of his condition. Conversely man may live most intensely in such moments because he participates in the beauty of the universe. When Camus emerges from bathing and greets his friends: he was saturated with delight and bleached by the sun. Disintegration of self may be a liberation from the tedious ties of everyday life. At these moments the primitive of Camus exulted in the beauty he felt around himself.

Meursault the 'hero' of the stranger, trusts only his own experience and dismisses philosophy and tradition. He is watchful, observant of the details of human life and cosmic situations, in all their manifestations and details. However he doesn't find any ultimate standard of justification of his personal actions as well as the social responses thereof. There are no ideological or philosophical norms by reference to which he could pronounce moral judgements and examine his personal behaviour as well as the social reactions therearound. It seems to him that all actions as well as situations are de-

troupe; and no ethical or philosophical criteria can be deemed to be ultimate and absolute in view of the fact that all standards, in order to be justifiable need other standards of evaluation and so an add infinitum. We can nowhere stop and accept any set of given standards as beyond the ken of criticism. Therefore human life as well as cosmic situation seems to be normless and Meursault finds himself in a meaningless and absurd life-situation.

He stands, in fact outside the whole moral world in a peculiar state that Camus describes as "innocence", apparently because in a world that affords no transcendental sanction for human judgements of right and wrong there can be no real guilt. His relationship to his mother and to his mistress are devoid of feeling, and he eventually kills an Arab for no particular reason. But at the very end of the novel, after Meursault, facing execution, has burst into a rage against a priest who tries to persuade him to accept the reality of his guilt and the possibility of redemption. There is a long semipoetic passage in which he declares his love of the world and it is ~~sen~~sconscious imediacacy and speaks tenderly and almost lovingly of his fellowmen and of their common fate, which he shares. Camus wishes to persuade us that these two aspects of Meursault's character are not just consistent but intimately related to one another, but again he experienced difficulty in showing how a positive ethic of human fraternity can be generated by a

nihilistic attitude towards all values.

The utter absurdity of life is indicated by Meursault's utter rejection of one life-situation or life-style for another one. All life situations and life-styles or states of affairs are as good or as bad as any. How can we sit in judgement on a particular life-situation and pronounce it either good or bad. Kierkegaard in his exposition of the existential dialectic trifurcates human life into aesthetic, ethical and religious stages. It so seems that he regards religious stages to be higher than the aesthetic stage. It is so because Kierkegaard affirms man's relationship to God and God as revealed in scriptural texts becomes the ultimate standard of justification. However Camus's character i.e. Meursault fails to differentiate in between various given situations of life. Possibly it sounds presumptuous to him to accept religious or ethical criterion to be justifying or presiding factors that are widely believed to be controlling and guiding in multiplex given situations of life. Meursault is sceptic as well as a nihilist. Possibly he thinks that it is we who confer meanings and values to various life-situations and contexts. Our judgements are arbitrary and lacking in any authority. We can choose among various alternatives but all alternatives are devoid of any logic or meaning e.g. when Meursault's boss asks him about going over to Paris and attend to a business project over

there, adding that he was a young man and parisian life must be more attractive for him, Meursalt replies;.... "you could never change your life, that in any case one life was as good as another and that I wasn't all dissatisfied with mine here."⁴⁰ Meursalt further muses with himself, "he looked upset and told me that I always evaded the question and that I had no ambition, which was disastrous in the business world so I went back to work. I would rather not have upset him, but I could not see any reason for changing my life. Come to think of it, I wasn't unhappy. When I was a student, I had plenty of that sort of ambition. But when I have to give up my studies I very soon realised that none of it really mattered".⁴¹

Camus developed a kind of existentialism of the absurd and has been described as an 'anti-theist' rather than an theist. For him, sisyphus is the symbol of mankind-the ancient hero who was condemned to spend his days rolling a boulder to the top of a hill, always to see it escape him and crash back down to the bottom. In "The myth of Sisyphus" camus believed that absurdity, in the sense of recognition and acceptance of the fact that there are no metaphysically guaranteed directives for conduct, could by itself generate a positive ethic. In particular, the ideal of human fraternity was connected with camus's heroic nihilism on the grounds that to accept oneself as the sole guarantor of one's own values would necessarily involve accepting a principle of respect for other human beings.

It was the injustice and cruelty of man to man that aroused Camus to action. Like many of the existentialists, Camus still tried to present these two revolts - the revolt against the human condition and the revolt against human injustice - as essentially continuous with one another. Nevertheless, he came to feel that the relationship between these two revolts had been misconceived and that the misconception was at the heart of twentieth-century totalitarianism, to which he was as resolutely opposed in its communistic as in its Nazi version. Camus gradually came to believe that the reason for the extraordinary miscarriage of the Soviet revolution was that the revolutionary tradition had its roots in a revolt against the human condition as such, and that such a revolt can never lead to human fraternity but leads instead to a new enslavement of man by man. This radical revision of his earlier views found its full expression in Camus's second main philosophical essay, 'The Rebel'.

The Rebel begins with the problem of murder or with the problem of political justification for the killing of human beings. For Camus political action is essentially violent revolt and it thus inescapably raises the question whether one has the right to take the life of another human being. Camus rejects metaphysical revolt, which he sees as a radical refusal of the human condition as such, resulting either in suicide or in a demonic attempt to depose God and remake the world in the image of man. Its deepest motive is not a love for mankind but

a desire to destroy the world as it is.

What Camus puts in La Peste is a forlorn confusion at the absurdity of life. The novel is a factual account reminiscent of Journalism, of the Plague in 1940s in French port on Algerian coast. The Plague is the early concept of the absurd, a secularised sense of tragedy and an analysis of the way a meaningless death gratuitously calls into question a life without meaning, or a life amounting at best, to no more than death.⁴² It can be read at different levels - a stark description of the Plague and at a deeper level as a depiction of the absurdity of life where vital living has been restrained by habits. The description of the rates and the reactions of the people, show how habits restrain common sense. The dead rates are meaningless and not associated with the wide spread Plague.

The story of the novel is a telling commentary on the absurd life situation man is caught in. Dr. Rieux, who is the surgeon narrator of the novel starts the story by discovering a dead rat. The story ends with several thousands of dead rats plus the Plague's first death-monsieur Michel. As the story progresses the situation worsens. Day in and day out more and more rats and flees die and scavengers have a tough time, in clearing them. One day it so happens that rats from all quarters spring up on roads, basements, cellars and sewers and die in thousands. One could hear the shrill of

little dearth cries of the rats. Even in the posh areas of the town one could find them in heaps. After every clean up the rats would again appear in increasing numbers and people started crying for extra-ordinary official measures to combat this menace. The official reaction is thoroughly routinized and bureaucratic. A friend of Dr. Rieux Jean Tarron is the only person who keeps a note book on the progress of Plague and can sense the significance of the dying rats and their decaying bodies. As the Plague starts taking its toll Rieux and Tarron discover another Plague like Phenomenon - the red-tape of bureaucracy. Dr. Rieux is convinced that persons suffering from unidentified fever should be isolated. However, he can not do anything in view of the fact that his colleagues insist that they have no definite proof that the fever is highly infectious. The Doctor cannot certify what the disease is although horrified at the daily toll which the disease takes. The doctor discovers that the local magisterate need also to be consulted in this regard. The municipal officials are also taking it easy. The people in general are leading a monotonous life, almost like mechanical robots. There is an all round lack of understanding of the gravity of the situation.

Thus the novel The Plague has an allegorical significance. It is an allegory on the meaning of living and meaning of death. Life is not a bed of roses but at least as bad as the Plague. Realization of the essential tragic character of the existence is the only feature worth eulogising, infact the

only redeeming feature. The central theme of the novel is again the absurdity of human existence. The rats exemplify common people and the indifferent bureaucracy and government represent the indifference of the universal order if any to the deepest predicament of human struggle. Again Camus reverts to this favourite theme by depicting man as caught in the coils of existence and forsaken and forgotten by the unconcerned gods he has been living in. Again human existence is represented as alienated in view of the overwhelming absurdity of human condition - a condition where everybody seems diseased and yet everybody seems unconcerned about everybody.

Even in Camus's *Caligula* we find tragedies and suffering of human existence. *Caligula* is a play about the young Roman emperor who brutally kills his courtiers. At the outset of the play *Caligula* is shocked by the death of his sister, Drusilla, with whom he has been having an incestuous love affair. He sets out to revenge her death in a rivalry of killing that lasts until he is assassinated by the partisans he has tormented.

Drusilla's death has plunged *Caligula* into a dualistic universe where he is confronted by otherness. He has a personal God. Drusilla's death has demonstrated that man is at the mercy of gods; his only significant acts are those which assume the God's prerogatives, namely suicide and murder. There is a link between violence and totality. *Caligula* has a

death wish. He feels a kinship with his victims and he courts assassination. Conversely he kills in order to achieve the immortality which the gods have until now, kept for themselves.

Calligula cannot bear the pain that he feels; "my skin hurts me, my chest and limbs too..... I have only to move my tongue and everything turns black and people become loathsome to me."⁴³ This is the anguish of man's mortal condition and Calligula has a special place in Camus's early writings in view of the same. Sisyphus finds reasons to be happy while Stranger depicts morality as an absence, in Calligula it is presented as a mind trapped in a confrontation with what it is not. Since the emperor cannot stand this he is overwhelmed by hatred of others and of himself. Yet murder offers no solution because the murderer's supposed joy is as finite as everything else. When he has killed one person Calligula, like all other terrorists has no choice but to kill someone else. Whatever he does, he remains an object of hatred to himself. In one act Calligula destroys the mirror confronting him as he can no longer stand the sight of himself, 'it is always you I meet, you are always there opposite me and I hate you'.⁴⁴ Calligula cannot bear the burden of guilt. Everyone is guilty because there are no judges who could declare that men are innocent.

Thus in Calligula Camus does not merely bring out the meaninglessness of life but makes death and tragedies of human existence the core and the crux of this drama. He says

that 'Death is an ordinary incident. While uttering this I take oath that it is the definite simple reality'.⁴⁵ Human suffering in an absurd world is central to the theme of the drama.

Le Mythe de Sisphé is a philosophical essay which explores the existential predicament of man. In this novel Sisyphus is a Greek mythological character who was accused of having divulged secret of gods. He had seen Jupiter kidnapping Isma - the daughter of Esiyphus which he reported to her father. The gods had condemned Sisyphus to spend eternity pushing a rock up a hill and watching it roll back down when it reached the top. Sisyphus' condition according to Camus, constitutes what may be called the state of the absurd. Camus has tried to convey that man in this universe is condemned like Sisyphus to perennial struggle which delivers no results. In fact "Le Myth de Sisphe" is a story of human destiny and Sisyphus symbolizes the meaninglessness and absurdity of both human life and universal order. Man is in a continuous journey but reaches nowhere. Human life is a story of ceaseless suffering. Man would like to make his life pleasant and peaceful by following great ideals and values. However he encounters hurdles at every step and all his projects are doomed to failure and extinction. Man is subservant to certain blind forces which can not be exactly pin-pointed. All human and social ideals turn out to be farcical. The practical life cares a fig for our ideals and values. We can't liberate ourselves from this life - situation

even by faithfully following all the best ideals of the world. There is no point in involving the blessing of God for there is none. We are surrounded by opaque hurdles and impassable walls. There is no logical or rational justification for these hurdles. All human endeavour is futile. Man seems to be a toy in the hands of destiny and death seems to be the only exit from the torture chamber of existence. This view of human existence as culled out from Camus's writings is a devastatingly radical reinterpretation of human condition in the overall scheme of so called universal order. Human existence is a continuous confrontation with a universe oozing out, so to say, absurdity from all its pores. No interpretation, no view point and no theoretical construction seems to clinch the issue. Man is robbed by his metaphysical garments and finds himself naked of meaning and innocent of value in contemporary life-situation.

As pointed out by Patrick McCarthy, "The simplest definition of the absurd would be rephrasing of Descartes' proposition, 'I think therefore I am'. Camus might have stated that, "I am another to myself, therefore I am". The absurd is not a state to be overcome because it represents a victory over the previous state of suicidal mysticism. Yet it remains a religious vision because man does not forget his need for God and becomes a pragmatist who is content to give a shape to his earthly existence. Camus's originality lays in his attempt to preserve man's religious sense although it could not be

satisfied and to make him live in the absence of God".⁴⁶

The real meaning of Sisyphee is expressed in lyrical passage which depict the absurd as an adventure. We must accept the heart-rending marvellous gamble of the absurd, make a serious effort to do it and face the blast of consequences thereof. Only then will man's body, his nobility, his tenderness etc. recover their place in this absurd world. His greatness will be nourished by the wine of absurd and the bread of indifference.⁴⁷ For camus the absurd is the conflict between man's desire for meaning and the shapelessness of his condition. Dignity is the way to transcendent that condition. Sisyphus attains it when he affirms his superiority over the rocks.

Camus' novels and dramas are not written for the sake of art nor do they preach any new-fangled ideology. His works bring out the significant social, political and philosophical problems of modern age. They reflect the deepest issues of human existence. Such questions as; why should man undergo so much suffering; what are the factors responsible for human suffering; are those factors external and circumstantial or internal and personal; are values or ideas inspired by genuine and authentic commitment or motivated by Selfishness, hypocrisy and economic profit etc; are addressed to in his writings and his novels revolve round them. His responses and reflections to these questions add upto what may

be called Absurdism. This philosophy of absurdism is possibly a function of the crises of contemporary civilization. And the concept of this absurdism leads man to the concept of outsider. The basic problem of "The outsider" is his instinctive rejection of the everyday world, a feeling that it is somehow boring and unsatisfying like a hypnotized man eating saw dust under the belief that it is eggs and bacon.⁴⁸ Actually, the outsider's sense of unreality cuts off his freedom in an unreal world as it is to jump while one is falling. Freedom being intensity of will is not something to do what one likes and will depends upon motive. If there is no motive, there is no willing, one cannot do anything unless he believes that to be meaningful. And belief must be believed on the existence of something, in other words we can say belief is concerned with what is Real. Beliefs are born out of our convictions about the reality of the things we are surrounded by. When nothing is or seems real, how can we against all the pressures of our so-called conscience as well as common sense go on deluding ourselves to live and die for any set of beliefs. An existential illumination or analysis leads us to postulate that we are living in an unreal world and we accept this reality in the marrow of our being. This sense of unreality hinders us from participating in life and we become alienated from those who participate.

CHAPTER V

PRESCRIPTIONS FOR DEALIENATION

Alienation cannot be fully overcome as long as there are multiple accounts of the source and nature of alienation. The basis of alienation lies in the existence of a plurality of philosophies which never allow man to view himself under one pattern only. Of course Marx thinks his proposed revolution in the control of material sources of power can eliminate Alienation. However that can only come about if all men accept Marx with interpretation of his teachings. This is not possible as far as intellectual freedom is concerned. Those who regard Self-alienation as a psychological fact, dispute importance of any external changes in circumstances and suggest the individuals own moral effort, i.e. a revolution within the Self, as the only cure. Those who regard Self-alienation as a result of the neurotic process are consistent in offering a psychoanalytical treatment.

Self-alienation reveals itself as a dynamic and comprehensive attempt to avoid the painful experience of inner conflict. By remaining alienated from himself and detached from others, the patient avoids the anxiety connected with emotional involvement in conflict. But he pays for this with a steadily increasing restriction of his life, his feelings and his wants, he pays with a loss of his self.

Self-alienation is unavoidable result of the neurotic

process. Simultaneously, it is an active move against the real Self:

1. Alienation prevents disturbing Self-awareness. The alienated patient often complains of being "in a fog" but unconsciously he wants to stay in it. He welcomes Self-anesthesia.
2. Alienation in the sense of conforming like an automation, protects him from the burden and the responsibility of commitment to himself and his identity. It permits Self-alienation.
3. Alienation, in its most active form, is the rejection of being oneself and the attempt to become the other, the ideal Self. It means escape from the hated Self through Self idealization.

These three ways, in which the "despair as not being willing to be oneself" finds expression, were already described by Kierkegaard. He called loss of the Self "Sickness unto death". The first way to avoid consciousness of the Self:

By diversions or in other ways e.g. by work and busy occupations as means of distractions, he seeks to preserve an obscurity about his condition, yet again in such a way that it does not become quite clear to him that he does it for this reason (that he does what he does in order to bring about obscurity)".

The second way "to avoid willing to be oneself" is willing to be simply the conventional Self:

"By becoming wise about how things go in this world, such a man forgets himself.... finds it too venturesome to think, to be himself, for easier and safer to be like the others, to become an imitation, a number, a cipher in the crowd. This form of despair is hardly ever noticed in world. Such a man precisely by losing himself in this way has gained perfectability in adjusting".¹

Kierkegaard here anticipates what today has become a mass phenomenon : Self-elimination through conforming "adjustment".

The third most radical way "to avoid willing to be oneself" is willing to become someone else.² Neurotics want to free themselves from the burden they experience their actual self to be, escape into fantasy, and try to become that ideal other self they feel they should be.

To get rid of his hated self is the pervasive motivation of the masochist. Early self rejection and active Self-alienation are the roots of masochists and homosexual trends. Self-elimination and identification with somebody else gives neurotics fantastic happiness as they get temporarily free from their hated self, but it also drives them into the Self-

destructive morbid-dependency relationship.

Actually Intellect and feeling must be harmonised if Self-alienation is to be overcome. If the harmony of intellect and feeling is neglected, a disproportion in the human soul is bound to appear. Whether this reconciliation comes in religion, in art or in a life of action, we cannot assume the removal of alienation until we have experienced such final harmony. Even then this cannot be the way for all men.

Philosophers and Sociologists hold that individuals are passive products of the Social organization, that the whole of Social organization is determined by the organization of economic life and that all is dependent on the question of whether the means of production are or are not private property.

In criticizing "the materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing" Marx stressed that, 'it is men that change circumstances and of human activity can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionizing practice (Praxis)'.³

Those who have tried to elaborate such a conception have insisted that dealienation of individuals and dealienation of society are closely connected. One cannot be carried without the other. It is possible to create a social system that would enable and even stimulate the development of dealienated

individuals, but is impossible to organize a society that would automatically produce such individuals. A non-alienated individual is an individual who fulfills himself as a free and creative being of praxis, and free creativity is not something that can be forced upon anyone from outside. An individual can become free only through his own activity.

It is only the communist mode of production, Marx felt, that alienation could be overcome. For in that mode of production the worker would be the master of the process of production. Consequently he would be in a position to reappropriate his lost praxis. Thus in the communist mode of production the objectification of the worker's labour will not prove alienation.

De-alienation of society and individual is an interlinked affair. Social and individual aspects of alienation are the two faces of one and the same human reality. One influences and is influenced by the other. Once we believe that alienation is inherent in the very nature of man i.e. it has an ontological growth of its own, it is difficult to think of a life which is completely free from all types of alienation.

Those who like Heidegger and Sartre are committed to the ontological notion of alienation will always be tormented by a sense of lack, whatever might be their socio-economic conditions.⁴ A man is and remains lonely in the world despite

the presence of others around him. His loneliness and craving for something else is a crucial fact of life. His desire for being something other than what he is, is inherent in him. It sustains him. The meaning of all human actions can be understood only in terms of our efforts to remove the imperfection. This brings out the creative implication of alienation. Our awareness, isolation and creativity are proofs of what we are yet to be. We need deeper integration in our life, both within and without. We want to overcome our passivity. By creating new things, we enlarge our area of inherited freedom. It is by continuously overcoming our limitations, that we have moved beyond barbarism to savagery, from savagery to the development of culture and civilization.

To exist as a self is to stand in the possibility of becoming at one with oneself or of being divided in oneself. To existentialists, these two possibilities are to exist 'authentically' or 'inauthentically'. An authentic man is one who recognizes the radical duality between the human and non-human. According to existentialists, man must live in the world; and being-in-the-world (which constitutes his conscious and purely authentic being), in which man recognizes his existence and knows his potentialities does not imply being-in-the-midst-of-the-world (which is the state of human inauthenticity, in which man loses his existence in the artificial man-made world which is the world transformed by human technology). They hold that an authentic life is one which is based upon an exact assessment of

human condition, while in in-authentic state man becomes forgetful of the ontological roots of his very being. The ontological necessities of human condition, existentialists hold, are degraded in the state of fallenness or inauthenticity. In-authenticity is the outcome of alienation and authenticity means de-alienation.

Iqbal's poetry and prose suggest to readers a straight way of dealienation. In the light of his concept of 'ego' or Khudi he asks man to overcome his manifold alienation. He is of the view that for a creative human person isolation from the world or detachment from the external circumstances is necessary. Poet's withdrawal from society and his feelings of loneliness is a healthy state of creative self that does not accept alienation. Here isolation is aimed at strengthening one's individuality and rejecting the fallen state of day-to-day being. It is rather first step towards de-alienation and a revolt against dehumanised society. With the product of his creative activity an artist or poet recovers his authentic self and establishes a new relation with nature and society by participating through his creative activity in reshaping human society and creating human values.

According to Iqbal, man should create his own world if he be amongst the living: **’اپنی دنیا آپ پیدا کر اگر زندوں میں ہے‘**

Human existence Sartre holds, lies beyond thought and it moves towards transcendence that offers a field for personal venture.

According to Karl Jaspers:

As human beings we are never Self-sufficient; we are not our own goal only but relate to Transcendence. It enhances us and simultaneously enables us to see through ourselves and realize that we are nothing.... Freedom and Transcendence lead to a basic consciousness.⁵

Sartre sets up a distinction between pour-soi and en-soi, and argues that values emerge as a result of the insertion of the former into the latter. In other words according to him values are expression of the Pour-soi's striving towards identification with the unattainable en-soi. The nihilizing movement of Sartre's Persoi towards its possibilities is really an essential mode of overcoming alienation, or that which Iqbal calls estrangement or separation 'فراق یا جدائی' or deprivation 'مہجوری', which is a recurrent theme in Iqbals most significant poetry. Man's longing and loneliness is his exclusive privilege because according to Iqbal the totality of the world of non-human beings is not prompted by this unique desire. He says⁶

دریا کہلا چاند تارے کیا جانیں فراق و ناصبوری
شایاں ہے مجھے غم جدائی یہ خاک ہے محرم جدائی

Rivers, mountains, the moon and stars - what do they know of separation and longing! The pain of separation - it makes me alone; this dust - it alone has known separation.

According to Sartre as well as Iqbal a creative being is condemned to alienation that produces an undying urge for bringing out man's hidden creative potentialities to overcome

alienation. Both of them hold that for a creative human individual estrangement from the dehumanised world or detachment from other external circumstances that reduce Being-for-oneself to day-to-day-being is very essential. Only in such a situation does man's creative impulse find a fruitful soil and he can create and reshape his world according to his aspirations.

Iqbal in his later Poetry suggests a way to dealienation. His 'authentic man' or mu'min (Ideal Man **مردِ مومن یا مردِ کامل**) is the vicegerant **نائب** of God (on earth), who has bestowed upon him His unique Attributes like knowledge, wisdom, freedom, creativity, power, patience, justice, consciousness, love, sympathy etc.

So we see Human life as an endless journey. It is a perpetual dialectic of alienation and dealienation. It provides man with mobility transitivity and creativity. In this journey of human life, whenever man becomes alive to certain questions he becomes an outsider. So the problem of an outsider is essentially a living problem. There is an appetite for progress in all outsiders. For the outsider, the world into which he has been born is always a world without values. Compared to his own appetite for a purpose and a direction the way most men live is not living at all, it is drifting. Unless he can evolve a set of values that will correspond to his own higher intensity of purpose, he may as well throw himself under a vehicle for he will always be a misfit. Cleopatra (an instance from Roman history)

was found of sticking gold pins into her slave girl's - breasts and derived gratification from their screams. Man everywhere and whoever he may be has preferred to act as he chose and not the least as his reason dictated. Whatever man wants is simply independent choice. Whatever that independence may cost and wherever it may lead.

But do such freedom not lead us into a complete individualism? If everyone is unique, are we not going to end up with a chaos in which everyone does his own thing. And is this not an exaggerated liberty? Sartre has written, "you are free, therefore choose - that is to say, invent. No rule of General morality can show you what you ought to do; no signs are Vouchsafed in this world".⁷ Sartre means that there is no God who establishes values of humanity. Every man must invent his own values and he exists authentically in so far as he strives to realize values that really are his own.

Modern man alienated from nature, from his Gods and from society in a depersonalised world is unable to achieve an identity and a relatedness to others. If there is anything that modern man regards as infinite it is no longer God, morality, nature or culture but it is his own power. And this power destroy to reduce to nothingness lies in our own hands. It is we who are infinite. On the one hand man is exercising freedom, will, decision, creativity, setting goals and striving for their attainment, he appears as a being possessed as

Schleiermacher expressed it, with a 'sense and the taste for the infinite'. On the other hand we have seen him in his 'throwness', a being of care and temporality, finally abandoned to death, so that his taste for the infinite is anchored to a radical finitude.⁸ We have seen him in his essential sociality as a being-with-others, capable of love and community. We have also seen that man is a being of conscience, aware of destiny to be fulfilled. But against this is to be set his Alienation.

So conflict and tension becomes the dynamic reality of human existence. And in such conflicting tendencies, nothing make sense, human existence fundamentally becomes absurd. Just as there are profound conflicts and tensions in existence itself, so there are differences among the existentialists as to how the threatening and destructive tendencies in man can be overcome.

Kierkegaard seems very close to Heidegger when he writes: 'The temporal is a snail's space, spreading out in time and space; the eternal is the intensive which hurries to meet death'.⁹

If we utilize the expression of Paul Tillich, it is in an 'ultimate concern' that finally gathers up the many proximate concerns of life and brings a unity and wholeness into existence.¹⁰ According to Paul Tillich, 'Nietzsche is the most impressive and effective representative of what could be called a "Philosophy of life", the principle of which is 'the will'

power.¹¹ By this he means the power that preserves and enhances life amidst the struggle for survival, and therefore runs through all existence. 'It is a principle whereby man consciously orders the available possibilities of his environment, and to reach this sort of mastery one must be disciplined, must first of all master himself and his own capacities'.¹² The Buddha also spoke of Self-Mastery as the key to life, for which a strict discipline is necessary. The drive to such a self-mastery arises when man realises the fact that he is mortal.

This is what Soren Kierkegaard said, that a man who comes to realise that "all men are mortal" knows the universal essence of all existence, but what is needed is that he should apply this truth to himself and come to conclusion in his own case, 'I too must die'. It is then that an Individual will feel the need to find a purpose, a plan and a destiny of life. From this existential point of view the doctrine of anatta has a deep significance in biblical theology and it is in this context that the psychophysical analysis of existence becomes meaningful.

According to the teaching of the Budha, the idea of Self is an imaginary, false belief which has no corresponding reality and it produces harmful thoughts of 'me' and 'mine', selfish desire, craving, attachment, hatred, ill-will, conceit, pride, egoism and other defilements, impurities and problems. It is the source of all the troubles in the world from personal conflict to wars between nations. In short to this false view can be traced all the evil in the world.¹³

In Buddhism discomfort, illness, unsatisfactoriness, unrest, anxiety, state of commotion, conflict and existential anxiety are used in different contexts to express dukha. Dukha describes the predicament in which man is bound by conditioned existence in Samsāric life. It is tanha, the desire or thirst to exist to re-exist, to continue to exist, which arises as a result of the belief in a permanent Self or Soul which has thrown man into the predicament in which he is. Therefore to eliminate dukha it is necessary that one comes to a true understanding of the real nature of the Self - that is that there is no permanent self; that one is anatta. Thus we may state the relevance of the anatta doctrine to the human predicament as follows:

Man is in this dukha predicament because of his attachment (tanha) to a false notion of the self conceived as a permanent entity. In this predicament in which man is threatened by the possibility of non-being, he seeks for some security and imagines that he has an immortal soul on which he can depend. But he can not escape the fact that decay is inherent in all things. This conflict is the cause of dukha, it is the state of existential anxiety. It is an imaginary state of conflict between the real and the unreal conceptual invention of a permanent immortal self. And the solution to this problem consists in dispelling the false notion of the self. Hence it is of the utmost importance for one to realise the fact of soullessness (anatta). It is the realisation that leads to freedom from dukha.¹⁴

Moreover for Dealienation, the principle underlying the institution of Islam is a lofty one.

Islam abolishes all invidious class distinction. Subjectively it creates a peaceful mental attitude and objectively a peaceful order perfectly congenial to nature and thus eliminates pain from struggle, gives intense pleasure in man's natural struggle for existence and ultimately liberates the intellect from bondage of the will of egoism and altruism by establishing communion with (qudrat).¹⁵

Islam looks upon the universe as reality and recognises everything as real entity there. Islam does not encourage monastic renunciation and Self-denial. It aims at a progressive realization of the immense power of human soul. A life of action and struggle is therefore an essential requisite. A man is regarded as a finite centre of activity with infinite capacity for transforming the evil into good. The ethical basis of Islam is to maintain the harmony between religion and life. It synthesises the practical with the ideal and can satisfy both the spiritual and temporal aspiration of man. The ethical life is not a cross-section separated from the social context and from the organic whole of its own being. It takes a total view of human life and recognises the need and importance of reason and passion. It compares an individual life with that of community. And for dealienation what is needed is not individual morality but social

morality which is not generally found in the cases of other religions. Islam advocates for universal brotherhood of man. The Holy Quran says:

"O men! surely we have created you of a male and a female and made you tribes and families that you may know each other. Surely the most honourable of you with Allah is the one among you most careful of his duty".

The concept of brotherhood does not remain as a theory rather it has turned to be a living force. Prophet Mohammad (sm.) emphatically remarks:

"No one of you is a believer of God unless he loves for his brother what he loves for himself".

Islam encourages its believers to have a keen sense of dignity, responsibility, unity, faith, and discipline in a vast community where each individual is free to develop his own personality and understanding. The Holy Quran provides instructions for proper living, thinking and doing justice to the people. Islam is closely bound up with every aspect of life and creates an atmosphere favourable to moral growth and development. It does not demand from man the surrender of his reasoning faculties nor does it ask for blind subscription to inexplicable mysteries which confuse and plague human

understanding. Holy prophet discovered the secrets of creation and interpreted life in relation to the universal nature. He taught an order in life. That is the simplest way of dealienation.

Existentialism has yeilded penetrating insights into the mystery of human existence. Existentialism no doubt have developed an interesting approach to the problem of the feeling. But does not the granting of such a role commit us to an essentially tragic understanding of man as well as the world? Are we to take human existence as fundamentally absurd?

Can't anxiety be avoided by seeking refuge in conventional patterns of action and conventional scales of value.

Tagore considered grief to be a blessing of God which inspired him to write. Biographies depicting tales of courage and fortitude are pointers of hope. An indomitable spirit ruled the lives of Christ, Socrates, Galileo, Tolestoy, Lincoln and earned them a distinguished place in the annals of history. There achievement lies in their pledge not to let anxiety becloud judgement. We agree the suffering and unique men who not understood by their own age have met with nothing but contempt and suspicion. But we can not ignore the deep sense of belonging which inspired many creative individuals, whose bonds with their communities enabled them to sense the pulse

of their age. And even those creative men of the past who found an urge to break away from their community, from the accepted ways of thought, did not experience the kind of isolation which has become the fate of modern man. Their existence was tragic but not meaningless. They did not surrender their own selves. And in all their loneliness they did not go to pieces, as modern men do when they try to play roles which are alien to them.

The alienation which modern man experiences appears as a manifestation of a very fundamental trend i.e. his estrangement from God. How traditional religious language has spoken both negatively and positively about God. It has recognised his worth and his otherness as well as his love and his closeness. Infact it is Religion only that gives a connected amount of the different attempts which try to solve the problem of existence. Its history attempts to insert each world-view in its proper setting to understand it as a part of organic whole, to connect it with the intellectual, political, social and cultural factors.

It is an attitude of faith that world is something worthwhile. To a civilised world, Religion is the superstition that attributes to the miseries of man. But we ought to bear in mind that man by nature is an imperfect being and the knowledge he has got is more or less limited. There are so many things which are unknown and inconceivable though

remaining physically existent in the phenomena under investigation. Thus the supernatural agency though doubted can not perhaps be ignored. Religion must be regarded as one of the most important and fascinating way to dealienation.

"Religion provides us with the conservation of socially recognised values through specific actions. Though more or less a matter of feeling and practical experience, it tries to gain a true insight into the general structure of the universe and man's relation to it and tries further to grasp the nature of the universe and to understand man's position, functions and destiny in it. Man at first interprets the phenomena and projects his own nature into them and fashions them after his own image. But above them there lies an ultimate Designer who is believed to evoke some agency different from the ordinary ego of the individual or from other human beings and these imply a feeling of dependence upon this agency".¹⁶

Thus Religion always paves the way to better life. The inner urge the struggle for existence and the philosophy of evolution offer us a foundation for the philosophy of conduct. Moral laws are the rules of successful living.

Nothing is good in human life except the best that man's nature can achieve. As men advance, things which have been good cease to be good merely because something better is

possible. This better criterion is the outcome of Religion. The activities of man are derived from three sources, namely instinct, mind and spirit. Of these it is the life-spirit that makes religion. But these three factors are not actually separated from each other; but they are distinguishable in thought only.¹⁷

In our depersonalised world we don't find any harmony between instinct, mind and spirit. For a better and peaceful life these factors must go together, in order to avoid alienation.

A religious man views love of man and women both in himself and in others quite differently from the man who is exclusively dominated by mind. He dedicates the life in the attainment of the ultimate reality and greater values in life. The life-spirit has suffered in recent times by its association with traditional religion. It brings the joy of the vision, of the mystery and profundity of the world, of the contemplation of life and above all the joy of universal love.¹⁸

The good of man is thus the aim of Religion and for the attainment of this it has placed before man certain notions of morality. Religion derives a complete and a synthetic view of things and life. The good of the religious life rests in God who is the Supreme Being in this universe. He exercises power over nature and man. Man's belief in God is as old as

his relation to the world. In his transactions with the world he often finds himself so placed that his wishes, activities, fortunes, health and diseases are often beyond his control. Happenings appear to him quite puzzling and mysterious. They create in him a conviction that he is too small and helpless. So man ought to believe in a power which seems to control the destiny not only of his own but also of the world at large. That is the ultimate remedy for dealienation.

From existentialism we can learn truths that are indespensable to our condition. The core of existential philosophy expresses man's alienation. It hardly shows and according to many of its advocates does not even claim to show- a way out of the estrangement.

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